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Separation of Powers and the Scope
of Federal Equitable Remedies
Robert F. Nagel*
In recent years, both popular I and academic2 attention has be-
gun to focus on the innovative and expansive remedies that federal
courts have utilized with increasing frequency, especially against
state governments. These forms of relief raise the question whether
the judiciary has begun to tolerate in itself a blending of functions
that would never be tolerated in another branch of government.3
Federal district courts largely have assumed the duties of adminis-
tering a state mental health system 4 and a state prison.5 Many feder-
B.A. 1968, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School. Associate Professor of
Law, University of Colorado. The preparation of this Article was supported in part by a
fellowship from the University of Colorado Council on Research and Creative Work.
1. E.g., NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 42-47; N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 2;
id. Apr. 9, 1977, § 1, at 19, col. 3; id. Mar. 17, 1977, § 1, at 30, col. 4; see Miller, Conflicting
Signals, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 1977, at 10.
2. E.g., 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS (1972); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109
(1969); Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 903 (1976);
Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and
Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 893 (1977); Roberts, The Extent of Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South
Boston High School, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 55 (1976); Taft, Recent Developments in Social
Welfare Law and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 52 IND. L.J. 345 (1977); Developments in the
Law--Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1965); Comment, Enforcement of Judicial Financing
Orders: Constitutional Rights in Search of a Remedy, 59 GEo. L.J. 393 (1970); Note, Receivership as
a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 115 (1969); Comment, Equitable Remedies:
An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neoreceiverships to Implement Large Scale Institutional
Change, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 1161; Note, Monitors: A New Equitable Remedy? 70 YALE L.J. 103
(1960); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change,
84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
3. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 904; Robbins & Buser, supra note 2, at 927; Note, The
Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, supra note 2, at
1379.
4. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd in relevant part sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), afrd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). Very recent cases demonstrate that such
decrees were not isolated experiments. E.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss.
1977); Rhem v. Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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al courts are intimately involved with operating public school sys-
tems,6 and one court has placed a public high school directly under
judicial control.7 For some years, of course, courts have mandated
state apportionment schemes.8 One court has ordered the reorgani-
zation of an entire city government.9 In short, courts have exercised
traditionally executive functions by appointing executive and quasi-
executive officers responsible to the judiciary and by determining
administrative processes in elaborately detailed decrees; they have
exercised legislative functions by setting policy standards for the
operation of state and federal programs, including the setting of
budgetary requirements. 10 As Professor Chayes bluntly stated:
The decree seeks to adjust future behavior, not to compensate for
past wrong. It is deliberately fashioned rather than logically de-
duced from the nature of the legal harm suffered. It provides for a
complex, on-going regime of performance rather than a simple,
one-shot, one-way transfer. Finally, it prolongs and deepens,
rather than terminates, the court's involvement with the dispute.I'
Not surprisingly, perhaps, in light of the judiciary's institutional
needs and biases, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers has no bearing on the problem of
defining the limits of federal courts' equitable powers against state
governments. 12 The more extreme implications of this position are
unacceptable by nearly any standard. 13 As applied at the federal
level, the fundamental assumption behind separation of powers is
that because no branch of government can be trusted in its use of
power, the power of each branch must be limited by some degree of
6. See, e.g, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977); cases cited in note
256 infra.
7. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
(1977); see Roberts, supra note 2, at 55.
8. The trend started with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which held the constitu-
tionality of state apportionment schemes to be a justiciable, nonpolitical question that need not
rely on the clause guaranteeing a republican form of government. The one-person-one-vote
standard was announced in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For more recent examples,
see White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187
(1972); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
9. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
10. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). See generally Hill, supra note 2; Comment, Enforcement ofJudicial
Financing Orders: Constitutional Rights in Search of a Remedy, supra note 2.
11. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1298.
12. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976); see text accompanying notes 26-36 infra.
13. This might account for the fact that even advocates of innovative forms of judicial
relief often assume, despite the case law, see text accompanying notes 26-36 infra, that
separation of powers is an applicable doctrine. E.g., Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307; Johnson,
supra note 2, at 904.
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functional specialization. 14
The federal judiciary is not immune from the need for limita-
dons based on functional differentiation. James Madison observed
that if the judicial power were joined with the legislative and execu-
tive powers, the judge "might behave with all the violence of an
oppressor."'15 Subsequent history provides sobering examples of in-
adequate self-discipline by the judiciary in defining the limits of its
own authority.
For example, the Supreme Court held in In re Debs16 that the
federal judiciary had the inherent power to punish union strikers
for contempt when the strikers disobeyed an injunction issued to
protect the free flow of commerce. Because the injunction did not
enforce any specific statute, the Court in effect assumed for itself
the authority to share Congress' plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce.1 7 Moreover, the efforts of the judiciary to enforce its
own labor rulings involved the courts in the "essentially executive
and military" power required to control civil unrest.18 It is thus not
too much to say that in Debs the judiciary assumed for itself that
combination of all three essential governmental functions-legisla-
tive, executive and judicial-that Madison, the most pragmatic of
the framers, had described as "the very definition of tyranny." 19
The need for discipline in defining the authority of each branch
does not evaporate when the federal government exercises power
against state governments. It is not merely recent experience with
malapportionment, segregation and inhumane prison conditions
that demonstrates the extreme pressures that can exist for using the
federal courts as substitutes for the other institutions of govern-
ment. In the last century it became fairly obvious that under certain
circumstances of fiscal mismanagement the constitutional protection
against the impairment of contracts could be vindicated only by
placing substantially all of the governmental functions of a bankrupt
city into judicial receivership. 20 The Supreme Court rejected the
conclusion that the Constitution permits, much less requires, the
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). See generally M. VILE, C6NSTITUTIONALISM AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (quoting Montes-
quieu).
16. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
17. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 382 (1976); see F.
FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, LABOR INJUNCTIONS 18-19 (1930).
18. 158 U.S. at 597 (quoting petitioner's brief).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
20. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880).
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right of self-government to be suspended in order to effect a par-
ticular constitutional guarantee, 21 and the conclusion should be
equally rejected today. The substitution of government by the fed-
eral judiciary for local self-government involves dangerous dispro-
portionality; it sacrifices fundamental democratic values in order to
vindicate particular constitutional rights. Specific rights of specific
plaintiffs are secured by autocratic mechanisms of broad impact.
Despite these dangers, neither courts nor commentators have
attempted a thorough analysis of the implications of applying the
principles of separation of powers to the federal judiciary's relation-
ships with state governments. Even when assuming that separation
of powers is an applicable doctrine, legal commentators have
warned against attempting conceptual or doctrinal applications of
the idea of separation of powers. 22
The purpose of this Article is to suggest that separation of
powers clearly does impose limitations on the authority of federal
courts to undertake executive andlegislative functions when order-
ing relief against state officials. Part I proposes that separation of
powers restricts the power of any branch of the federal government
when it operates against the states. Part II analyzes separation of
powers theory and case law in light of the competing doctrine of
checks and balances. This analysis identifies common, underlying
principles by which the Court has reconciled these doctrines in
defining the powers of each branch of the federal government. Part
III applies the developed separation of powers principles to current
judicial doctrines and practices, deriving principled limitations for
the equitable powers of the federal courts over state institutions.
This approach suggests that separation of powers not only is doc-
trinally relevant and useful, but is superior to recent Supreme Court
attempts to justify restrictions on the equitable power of the lower
courts. 23 The analysis provides an intellectual mechanism that could
help correct for institutional bias by requiring the judiciary to define
its own authority according to the same principles that limit the
powers of the other branches.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM
Professor Gunther has described the principle of separation of
21. Id. at 520-21 (Field, Miller and Bradley, JJ., concurring in the judgment). But see
note 265 infra.
22. See Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307; Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on
the Vitality of a Constitutional Idea, 52 ORE. L. REV. 211, 213-23 (1973).
23. See text accompanying notes 255-85 infra.
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powers as a "horizontal" division of power among the three
branches of the national government. 24 The "vertical" distribution
of power between the national government and the states is thought
to be encompassed sufficiently by the concept of "federalism."25 The
current position of the Supreme Court appears to be that this
dichotomy is so neat as to liberate federal courts entirely from any
formal constitutional constraints against assuming the functions of
state executive or legislative departments.
A. The Current View: Separation of Powers Does Not Apply to the
Federal-State Relationships
In Elrod v. Burns,26 the Court dealt with the first amendment
issue raised by the politically motivated firing of non-civil-service
county employees. In holding that the patronage dismissal of em-
ployees in nonpolicymaking positions impermissibly burdens politi-
cal affiliation, a plurality of the Court rejected the argument that the
method of appointment and removal of executive officers was a
matter for the executive branch: "The short answer to this argu-
ment is that the, separation-of-powers principle, like the political-
question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary's rela-
tionship to the States."27
This stark distinction between the horizontal and vertical appli-
cation of separation of powers retains the content but not the modu-
lation of decisions dating back to Baker v. Carr,28 which approved
judicial determination of the constitutionality of state apportion-
ment schemes. 29 The Baker Court acknowledged that the principle
of separation of powers imparts constitutional significance to the
"political question" doctrine,30 but suggested that this doctrine
should be applied differently when "it is the relationship between
the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States,
which gives rise to the 'political question.' "31 Although the Court did
24. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 400 (9th ed. 1975)
(emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
27. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). The plurality opinion was written by Justice Brennan,
joined only by Justices Marshall and White.
28. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29. Id. at 229-37; see Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, in THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM THE SUPREME COURT
REVIEW (P. Kurland ed. 1965).
30. 369 U.S. at 210.
31. Id.
April 1978]
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treat the "lack of judicially discoverable standards" as relevant to
defining the courts' proper role with respect to the states,3 2 the
extreme conclusion in Elrod that separation of powers does not
apply at all to the relationship between the federal judiciary and the
states is presaged by the repeated emphasis in Baker on the irrele-
vance of "matters of state governmental organization. ' 33
Similarly, when the defendant in Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educa-
tional Equality League3 4 argued that elaborate judicial supervision of
discretionary executive appointments would improperly involve the
judiciary in executive functions; the Court replied that the case had
"nothing to do with the tripartite arrangement of the Federal
Constitution."3" Again, however, the Court's rejection of a separa-
tion of powers argument was qualified by the admonition to the
lower court to assign greater weight to similar considerations of
democratic accountability and "delicate issues of federal-state rela-
tionships."36
Despite the opportunity that these cases and others3 7 have pro-
vided for vertical application of separation of powers principles, the
Court has refused to take that step; instead, it has adopted the
position, typified by the conclusion in Elrod,8 that separation of
powers does not apply to the relationship between the federal courts
and the states.
The distinction between vertical and horizontal separation of
powers assumes that the power of judicial review inherently au-
thorizes federal courts to do whatever is necessary to protect
constitutional rights from infringement by less-than-coordinate
branches of government.3 9 The assumption has been that if a state
legislature or executive does not cooperate to achieve the objectives
of a federal judicial decree, the need to enforce the constitutional
mandate must take precedence over concern for maintaining the
separate definition of their functions.40 For example, in Wyatt v.
32. Id. at 214, 217.
33. Id. at 218; see id. at 210, 223, 226.
34. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
35. Id. at 615.
36. Id. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396"U.S.
320, 341 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
37. See notes 77-99 & 255-84 infra and accompanying texts.
38. 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976); see text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
39. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
40. See, e.g., Robbins & Buser, supra note 2, at 929.
[Vol. 30:661
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Stickney41 the federal court ordered such pervasive changes in a state
mental health program that the cooperation of the state executive
and legislature was necessary for administering and funding the
court's program. The possibility of noncooperation from these de-
partments merely elicited from the court indications that it would
then begin assuming those executive and legislative functions it-
self.4
2
The assumptions behind the Supreme Court's present position,
then, are that separation of powers and federalism are unrelated
concepts and that the vertical application of separation of powers
would be inconsistent with the supremacy clause. Both of these
assumptions are incorrect; they are dealt with in turn below.
B. The Traditional View: Separation of Powers Applies to the Federal-
State Relationship
Separation of powers means that the powers delegated to each
branch of the federal government are measured in part by contrast
to the powers delegated to the other branches. 43 Article III of the
Constitution vests the judiciary only with "the judicial Power,"44 and
separation of powers provides some of the principles that define the
scope of the judicial power. Because the federal judiciary was never
delegated any power other than the "judicial Power," the language
of the 10th amendment strongly implies that the states are protected
from the judicial exercise of legislative or executive powers.45 To be
41. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. 344 F. Supp. at 394.
43. In a case involving the legislative contempt power, the Supreme Court illustrated
how the nature of one branch's function is used to mark the limit of another branch's
function: "[T]he House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority,
but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the
government, because it was in its nature clearly judicial." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 192 (1880). See generally cases cited in notes 161 & 162 infra.
44. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 1. The Supreme Court has stated, for example: "[Article III's restriction of
judicial power to cases or controversies] expresses as well the Framers' desire to safeguard the
independence of the judicial from the other branches by confining its activities to 'cases of a
judiciary nature,'. . . and in this respect. it remains fully applicable at least to courts invested
with jurisdiction solely over matters of national import.' Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
581.82 (1962) (citations omitted).
45. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. This provision has been thought to be a protection from congressional exercise of
power that exceeds the legislative function as defined by separation of powers. Marshall v.
April 1978]
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sure, it is possible to argue from a literal interpretation of the 10th
amendment that the states are protected only from the exercise of a
power that has not been delegated to any branch of the national
government. This literal reading, however, is inconsistent with con-
siderable evidence that the 10th amendment was designed to protect
the states by distributional, as well as substantive, limitations.
1. The framers' intent.
The history of the 10th amendment suggests that one of its
specific purposes was to protect state institutions from federal viola-
tions of the principles of separation of powers. As the Supreme
Court has indicated, the purpose of the 10th amendment was "to
allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted. ' '46 One of those fears was expressed clearly at
the Massachusetts ratifying convention: "We dissent because the
powers vested in Congress by this constitution, must necessarily
annihilate and absorb the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
of the several States, and produce from their ruins one consolidated
government, which from the nature of things will be an iron handed
despotism . . . ."47 Similar apprehensions were voiced at the Vir-
ginia and Maryland conventions. 48 It is not surprising that the states
feared violations of separation of powers by Congress rather than by
the judiciary. It was the potential scope of the legislative power that
was most obvious at the time, due to recent experience with legisla-
tive "despotism" under the Articles of Confederation. 49 In contrast,
the judiciary was assumed to be without "influence over either the
sword or the purse," and was thought "to have neither Force nor
Will, but merely judgment. 50
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536 (1917); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 182-95 (1880). The
same result has been reached with respect to the executive power. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
46. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
47. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 667 (1971).
48. In Virginia, George Mason warned that congressional authority over the national
capital might lead to "unlimited authority, in every possible case." 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 431
(1876). He feared that the combination of functions delegated to Congress might interfere
with the prosecutorial and judicial functions of the states. Id. at 431, 442. In Maryland,
concern was expressed that Congress might use its powers to repeal state constitutions, many
of which included separation of powers provisions. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 732.
Similar apprehensions were voiced in South Carolina. Id. at 748-49. In North Carolina and
other states, more general but nevertheless consistent fears were expressed about the possibili-
ty of a tyrannical or aristocratic government. Id. at 934 & passim.
49. See notes 126-31 infra and accompanying text.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
668 [Vol. 30:661
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Several states incorporated their concerns for separation of pow-
ers into proposed amendments to the new Constitution that literally
prohibited violation of that principle by any branch of the national
government.5' The Virginia resolutions were the most important of
these proposed amendments because Madison used them as a model
when he first submitted the Bill of Rights to Congress. 52 The Virgin-
ians proposed both that "the legislative, executive, and judicial pow-
ers of government should be kept separate and distinct" and that
"each state. . . shall. . . retain every power. . . which is not by this
Constitution delegated" to the United States. 53 In presenting these
amendments to Congress, Madison stated them in separate para-
graphs of his eighth proposal.54 The House passed both paragraphs
and sent them to the Senate, which eliminated the separation of
powers language. The likely explanation for this deletion is simply
that the separation of powers clause was thought to be superfluous
because the broader language of what is now the 10th amendment
accomplished the same purpose. 55 This explanation is supported by
evidence that the House altered the language of the two aspects of
Madison's eighth proposal to make their parallelism highly appar-
ent. Thus, one proposal stated:
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of the
United States, shall be exercised as therein appropriated; so that the
legislative shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or
judicial; nor the executive the powers vested in the legislative or
judicial; nor the judicial the powers vested in the legislative or
executive.56
The next proposal stated: "The powers not delegated by the Constitution
51. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 666 (Pennsylvania dissenters); id. at 841 (Virginia);
id. at 967 (North Carolina); cf. id. at 732 (Congress' power shall be limited to that expressly
delegated by the Constitution (Maryland)). It is also noteworthy that all of the states that
proposed amendments included language similar to the present 10th amendment, and this
language in all probability was thought to include a prohibition against violations of separation
of powers. See text accompanying notes 55-72 infra.
52. 2 B. SCHWARTz, supra note 47, at 765, 1006-08.
53. Id. at 841-42.
54. Id. at 1028. The proposal stated: "Eighthly, That immediately after article 6th, be
inserted, as article 7th, the clauses following, to wit:
"The powers delegated by this constitution are appropriated to the departments to which
they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the
powers vested in the executive or judicial nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the
legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive
departments.
"The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively."
55. The Senate did not keep detailed records of its debates.
56. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 1123 (emphasis added).
April 1978]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
• . .are reserved to the states respectively." 57 It must have seemed
rather obvious to the Senate that the latter would include the for-
mer, assuming that the Constitution was thought to require separa-
tion of powers by its very structure-an assumption that was not
doubted then58 and is not doubted today. In short, the history of the
10th amendment strongly suggests that, to the same extent that the
Constitution's structure incorporates the principle of separation of
powers in defining the powers delegated to the federal government,
the reserved power of the states explicitly is protected from federal
incursions that violate that principle.59 That the contrary conclusion
is now accepted as constitutional dogma60 is an ironic testament to
the prescience of those who opposed the Bill of Rights on the
ground that the specification of limitations on federal power would
be construed to permit the exercise against the states of all powers
not explicitly itemized.61
The contrary conclusion also requires tolerance for a number of
other historically implausible ironies. First, some of those who op-
posed the Bill of Rights claimed that the amendments were unneces-
sary because separation of powers provided adequate restrictions on
the national government.62 It requires an assumption almost of
intellectual dishonesty on their part to conclude that these men did
not intend those same restrictions to protect the states at all. It would
be doubly implausible to conclude that such protection-assumed to
exist even without the 10th amendment-was not intended to exist
after the 10th amendment was adopted.
Second, the contrary conclusion would require the supposition
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. The evidence for this proposition is voluminous. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47,
51 (J. Madison); note 68 infra. Specifically, Roger Sherman, a congressional opponent of the
first paragraph of Madison's eighth proposal, argued that the amendment was "altogether
unnecessary, inasmuch as the constitution assigned the business of each branch of the Govern-
ment to a separate department." 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 1117. See id. at 1033.
59. The connection between the 10th amendment and separation of powers has, on
occasion, been treated as rather self-evident by the Supreme Court. For example: "The
Constitution of the United States delegates no judicial power to Congress. Its powers are
confined to legislative duties, and restricted within certain prescribed limits. . . .[B]y the Xth
amendment the powers not delegated to the United States . . .are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people. . . .And any legislation by Congress beyond the limits of the
power delegated, would be trespassing upon the rights of the States or the people .
Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 705 (1864). See cases cited in note 45 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 24-42 supra.
61. Madison's summary of this argument can be found in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47,
at 1027, 1031.
62. This argument was made by Hamilton, id. at 858, and by Wilson, id. at 631-33, 648;
it was answered by Madison, id. at 1030.
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that the framers intended the single phrase, "the judicial Power," to
denote a different and larger function when exercised against the
states rather than against competing federal authority. History sug-
gests, however, that the framers intended the federal judiciary,
when operating against the states, to be vested with not more but less
than full judicial power, as it is traditionally defined by contrast to
executive and legislative power. The granting of only enumerated
substantive powers to Congress narrowed the "legislative Powers" to
less than what separation of powers might permit. Similarly, the
limitations on jurisdiction in article III and the 11 th amendment 63
demonstrate that the federal judiciary was expected to wield less
power against the states than might a "court" defined only by refer-
ence to separation of powers theory.64 As the Supreme Court re-
cently has acknowledged, the Constitution was adopted only after its
opponents were assured that the federal judiciary would not have
the power to adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the states as
parties defendant.65 Given such concerns, it would be anomalous
indeed if the framers intended to vest the federal courts with powers
over the states that would be labeled executive or legislative at the
federal level.
Third, the conclusion that the 10th amendment does not protect
states from violations of distributional restrictions on federal power
undercuts the arguments made by the framers for judicial review.
For example, even Alexander Hamilton's nationalistic justification
for judicial review in The Federalist No. 78 hinged on the premise
that
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it
will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them .... The
judiciary ... has no influence over either the sword or the purse,
63. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
64. The framers were concerned that the federal courts "not... intrude unduly upon
the general jurisdiction of the state courts." Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,581 (1962).
See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 45-46 (rev. ed.
1937).
65. "The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to adjudi-
cate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active debate at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been
disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government, and it was
largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the existence of such Federal power
that the Constitution was finally adopted." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974)
(quoting I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIsTORY 91 (rev. ed. 1937)).
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no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society,
and can take no active resolution whatever.
66
This justification for judicial review loses its force if the judiciary
can command the sword or the purse of the states.
Fourth, the belief that the framers did not intend separation of
powers to limit federal authority over the states assumes that the
very framers who guaranteed to the states a republican form of
government 67 also vested the departments of the federal govern-
ment with the power to violate, at the state level, those institutional
limitations that were commonly considered an essential protection
against tyranny.6 8 Madison and Hamilton described a judiciary that
is "not separated from the legislative and executive powers" as "a
threat to general liberty, '6 9 as potential "oppressors., 70 The fram-
ers, it need not be belabored, simply did not believe they were
vesting the judiciary with the power to act as oppressors against the
states.
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
67. At the Constitutional Convention, Wilson first proposed art. IV, § 4 "merely to
secure the States agst. dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions." 2 M. FARRAND,
supra note 64, at 47. Randolph objected that the separate goal of securing the republican form
of government also was necessary; he moved, and Madison seconded, that the wording be
amended so that no state would "be at liberty to form any other than a Republican Govt." Id.
at 48. Wilson then reworded his motion from a guarantee of "a Republican Constitution & its
existing laws" to a guarantee of a "Republican (form of Governmt.)," at which point Randolph
and Madison withdrew their opposition and the motion passed. Id. at 49. Although this
debate does not necessarily imply that one particular set of institutional arrangements was to
be mandated to the states, it surely is incompatible with the conclusion that the states were not
to be protected from violations by the guarantor-the national government- of basic repub-
lican principles such as separation of powers. Compare Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929, 931
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (deputy sheriff removed from office by
federal government pursuant to contempt power) with Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 255 (1957) (separation of powers not mandatory in state governments), and Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) (separation of powers not required by due process clause).
68. Madison, for example, declared that the "accumulation of all powers legislative,
executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many. . . may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). He quoted Montesquieu with approval: "Were the power of judging joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for
the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor." Id. at 326. He described the separation of powers
principle as "essential to a free government." Id. No. 48, at 332. For discussions on the
prevalence of this assumption at the time of the framing, see M. VILE, supra note 14, at 119-
75; G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 548 (1969). Cf. 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 64, at 73-74 (the executive and the judiciary must be protected from
legislative encroachments).
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
70. Id. No. 47, at 326 (J. Madison).
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The framers knew that the states' constitutions required varying
degrees of separation of powers.71 This does not imply, however,
that the application of separation of powers to the relationship
between the federal government and the states is affected by the
specific structures of state institutions. The authority to exceed the
limits determined by principles of separation of powers never was
granted to the federal government, regardless of how state institu-
tions might be arranged. In fact, there is evidence that the framers
assumed that the fundamentals of separation of powers would be
maintained within the states and that, therefore, the people were
doubly insured against violation of this fundamental principle of
democratic government. 72 The assumption of such protection at the
state level, of course, would have been incompatible with an assump-
tion that the basic state institutional separation could be nullified by
violation of separation principles by federal departments.
Clearly, the framers saw federalism and separation of powers as
intertwined concepts, each designed to define and limit federal
power for the protection of both the state governments and the
people.73 Then, as now, the exercise even of the delegated, substan-
tive powers by the wrong branch of government presented unac-
ceptable hazards arising from the absence of the special institutional
constraints that are thought to be appropriate to the type of power
assigned to each branch and that exist because of the particular
organization of each branch. A "judicial" decision might improperly
be subject to popular pressures, 74 a "legislative" decision might
improperly be removed from the processes that assure democratic
71. Id. at 327-31; see 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 64, at 47-49.
72. "In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided
among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people. The different governments will controul each other, at the same time that each will be
controuled by itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(emphasis added). This assumption has been shared by the Court: "It is believed to be one of
the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law, that all the powers
intrusted to government, whether State or national, are divided into the three grand depart-
ments. ... Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (emphasis added). Accord,
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (separation of powers implicit in
federal and state constitutions); 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 126-27.
73. Cf. Dorsen, Separation of Powers and Federalism: Two Doctrines with a Common Goal:
Confining Arbitrary Authority, 41 ALt. L. Rav. 53 (1977) (separation of powers applies only to
the federal government, federalism to the federal-state relationship). See generally M. ViLE,
supra note 14, at 171.
74. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-46 (1965); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 3 (Bill of Attainder clause restricts congressional exercise of judicial power, arguably
because of fear of popular pressures).
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accountability75 or an "executive" decision might improperly be
made by an institution lacking the hierarchy for effective coordina-
tion and control. 76 In any event, the risks are that such power could
be used to excess, threatening individual liberties or state institution-
al arrangements, or that such power would be perceived as oppres-
sive and illegitimate.
2. The case law.
The conclusion of the Supreme Court, reiterated since Baker v.
Carr,77 that separation of powers does not apply to the relationship
between the federal and state governments, not only is at odds with
constitutional history, but also is inconsistent with case law preced-
ing and following Baker. The Baker Court took pains to demonstrate
that prior findings of nonjusticiability had "nothing to do with [the
claims'] touching upon matters of state governmental organiza-
tion."78 Thus the Court reduced a structural limitation on its power
to a mere discretionary admonition not to decide issues for which
"judicially manageable standards" are lacking. 79 The Court distin-
guished cases that undeniably had involved limitations on the judi-
cial power with regard to state matters by asserting that "these
decisions explicitly reflect only a traditional limit upon equity juris-
diction, and not upon federal courts' power to inquire into matters
of state governmental organization."80 This answer simply ignores
the possibility that "traditional equity jurisdiction" had been limited
by the courts as an implementation of separation of powers.
What the cases "explicitly reflect" is precisely the concern that an
equity court not "invade the domain . . . of the executive and
administrative department of the government,"8' and that the prop-
er role of the state legislature be protected from undue interference
by federal courts.8 2 Indeed, the history of equity jurisdiction dem-
75. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737 (D.D.C. 1971).
76. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 2.
77. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See text accompanying notes 26-37 supra.
78. Id. at 218.
79. Id. at 226. To the extent that the discovery of "judicially manageable standards"
involves judgments as to what kinds of questions are properly legislative and therefore not
judicial, it represents the same kind of abstract functional differentiation required by separa-
tion of powers doctrine. See texts accompanying notes 151 & 160-62 infra.
80. 369 U.S. at 231.
81. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888).
82. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551-56 (1946). In refusing to review a state
apportionment scheme, Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court: "The Constitution has many
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onstrates that equity power long had been formulated in part by the
vertical application of separation of powers. For example, in
Meriwether v. Garrett83 the Supreme Court prohibited a lower federal
court from appointing a receiver to levy taxes in an effort to protect
the bondholders of a bankrupt city.84 A plurality of the Court was
particularly concerned with federal judicial usurpation of the state
legislative power.85 Other cases demonstrate a similar regard for
state executive functions.86
In Baker, the Supreme Court also ignored other doctrines that
have implemented the vertical application of separation of powers.
For example, the Court in Younger v. Harris87 limited the judiciary's
commands that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly fall outside the conditions
and purposes that circumscribe judicial action." Id. at 556. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
268, 277-78, 282 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. 102 U.S. 472 (1880).
84. Id. at 502 (Field, Miller and Bradley, JJ., concurring in the judgment). See also Amy
v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 114 U.S. 387 (1885); Barkley v. Levee Comm'rs, 93 U.S. 258
(1876); Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655 (1873); Rees v. City of Watertown, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 116 (1873). These cases are of particular interest in light of the Court's
general hostility to efforts by state legislatures to avoid bond obligations. See 2 C. WARREN,
supra note 65, at 678.
Although separation of powers language is abundant in Meriwether, the plurality also
attempted to explain its decision by the tenuous claim that no constitutional violation had
occurred. This ambivalence, spawned by an unwillingness to acknowledge clearly that it might
not be within the judiciary's powers to redress fully some violations, is still apparent in judicial
opinions. See note 265 infra and accompanying text.
85. "The Federal judiciary has... brushed aside all legislation of the State impairing
(the obligation of lawful contracts]. When a tax has been authorized by law to meet them, it has
compelled the officers of assessment to proceed and levy the tax, and the officers of collection
to proceed and collect it. . . .In some instances. . . all attempts at its repeal have been held
invalid. But this has been the limit of its power. It cannot make laws when the State refuses to
pass them. . . . If the State has provided incompetent officers of collection, the Federal
judiciary cannot remove them and put others more competent in their place." 102 U.S.
at 520-21 (Field, Miller and Bradley, J.J., concurring in the judgment).
86. E.g., Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U.S. 50 (1915) (federal court has no authority to
appoint a commissioner to collect taxes in order to satisfy a state's obligations on its bonds);
Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U.S. 550(1885) (federal court lacks equity jurisdiction to levy
and collect taxes in order to satisfy a judgment against a state); Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 655 (1873) (no federal equity jurisdiction to levy and collect taxes to enforce
the payment of a state's bonds). Of particular interest is the manner in which these cases
defined "adequate remedy at law," making a rather obvious attempt at preventing the
judiciary from unduly interfering with state legislative and executive functions. In cases in
which writs of mandamus had been issued to require the collection of taxes to repay bond
obligations but no one would accept the post of tax collector, the Court found the remedy at
law adequate: "The remedy is in law and in theory adequate and perfect. The difficulty is in its
execution only. The want of a remedy, and the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy, are
quite distinct ... " Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U.S. 550, 554 (1885) (quoting Rees v.
City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 124 (1873)). This peculiar definition of "adequate"
served to keep the judiciary from appointing its own collection officers and thus from
assuming legislative and executive functions. See, e.g., 115 U.S. at 555-56, 559-60.
87. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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authority to pass on the "facial" constitutionality of state statutes in
light of the "fundamental conception of the Framers as to the
proper place of the federal courts in the governmental process of
passing and enforcing laws."88 Similar concern for competing state
decisionmaking processes has informed other decisions that help
define "the basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National
Government under our Constitution."8 9 Although this is not the
place to attempt any exhaustive analysis of the derivations of the
case or controversy requirement, it is noteworthy that the Court
itself has described the associated doctrines of standing, ripeness
and mootness as reflecting, in part, principles of separation of
powers. For example, the Court has said that efforts to adjudicate
"ill-defined" controversies would involve the judiciary in the "pow-
ers vested in the legislative or executive branches." 90 Similarly, the
rule against advisory opinions "implements the separation of powers
prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal courts to the
role assigned them by Article III." '91 The Court has stated that to
disregard the requirement of concreteness would "distort the role of
the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature
and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'govern-
ment by injunction.' "92 Such language is not restricted to cases
involving the "horizontal" application of separation of powers. In
cases involving the federal judiciary's relations with the states, the
foundations of such requirements have been described as lying "in
all that goes to make up the unique place and character, in our
scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for constitutional-
ity," in "the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally,
for each [branch] to keep within its power, including the courts."93
The underlying policies have been said to derive in part "from the
fundamental federal and tripartite character of our National Gov-
ernment and from the role. . . of the federal courts. . . within that
structure."94 At the least, such cases demonstrate that the Court has
applied "vertically" a range of doctrines that define the function of
the judiciary partially by reference to principles of separation of
powers, while simultaneously denying that separation of powers
applies vertically.
88. Id. at 53.
89. Id.
90. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947).
91. Fast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
92. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
93. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
94. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court historically has grounded its re-
luctance to interfere with the state police power on the principle of
separation of powers. In Mugler v. Kansas,95 a representative case,96
this "vertical" application of separation of powers was announced
unequivocally as the Court declined to find that a state law prohibit-
ing the manufacture of alcoholic beverages violated the manufactur-
ers' right to due process of law. The Court first stated the truism
that the initial authority to determine whether alcohol is injurious
lies with the legislative branch,97 and then proceeded to define the
proper judicial role as evaluating whether the enactment has a "real
or substantial relation" to the police power objectives.98 The Court
concluded that this degree of judicial deference was required be-
cause "it is a fundamental principle in our institutions . . . that one
of the separate departments of government shall not usurp powers
committed by the Constitution to another department." 99
95. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
96. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,537-39 (1971) (it is for the state legislature,
not the Court, to choose among all possible laws regarding rights of illegitimate children);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (the Constitution does not empower the
Court to second-guess state officials charged with the responsibility of allocating public
welfare funds); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) ("[I]t is up to legislatures, not
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
644 (1937) (Congress, not the Court, has the power to establish social security program);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (state legislature is free to adopt any economic
policy reasonably deemed to promote public welfare; the courts are without authority either
to declare such policy or to override the legislature); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74
(1905) (Harlan, White and Day, JJ., dissenting) ("The preservation of the just powers of the
States is quite as vital as the preservation of the powers of the General Government."); Atkin v.
Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903) (the judiciary should not abandon the sphere assigned to it
by fundamental law and enter the legislative; legislative enactments should be recognized and
enforced by the courts); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 398-99 (1798) (court cannot
overturn a legislative act it believes to be contrary to the principles of natural justice, unless the
state legislature acts beyond the scope of its authority). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
97. 123 U.S. at 660-61.
98. Id. at 661.
99. Id. at 662. More recent decisions implicitly acknowledge the need for judicial
deference, recognizing judicial inability to deal with some problems and giving the states wide
discretion in administrative and legislative areas. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29
(1976) (states have wide discretion in administering prison systems); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 578-80 (1975) (the Court required notice and hearing for cases involving short suspen-
sions from school, but refused to require prior hearing, in part because state and local
authorities bear responsibility for public education); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826-27
(1974) (prison officials were given latitude in drawing up guidelines for visitation with
inmates); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (courts traditionally are reluc-
tant to interfere with state prison systems because the problems are complex, intractable and
not readily susceptible to judicial resolution); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
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In short, the present refusal of the Supreme Court to define the
judicial power to grant equitable relief against the states by refer-
ence to principles of separation of powers represents a triumph of
formalism. The vertical and horizontal paradigms that underlie the
Court's position distort constitutional history and case law. They do
not express adequately the underlying purposes of either federalism
or separation of powers. Even if "federalism" is thought to be the
only appropriate term for defining the limits of federal power
against the states, separation of powers is one of its measures.
C. Vertical Application of Separation of Powers and the Supremacy
Clause
Once it is understood that the doctrine of separation of powers is
a measure of the authority delegated to the federal government, the
significance of the supremacy clause100 becomes problematical. It is
not possible merely to dismiss state institutional arrangements as
being subordinate to federal law, because the competing con-
sideration is not simply the states' institutional arrangements, but
the structural limitations of the Constitution on the power of the
federal judiciary. The tension, then, is between the possibility that a
clearly subordinate state policy might infringe a federal constitu-
tional right, and the possibility that the method of protecting that
right might itself violate the Constitution.' 10 The proper resolution
of this dilemma cannot be to abandon the constitutional decision-
making structure.
Article III does not delegate all powers necessary fully to redress
constitutional violations, but only "the judicial Power" to try cases
arising under the Constitution. If an impermissible combination of
functions is thought to be necessary to protect the constitutional
rights under adjudication, the remedy does not "comport with the
federal system of government embodied in the Constitution," °10 2 and
therefore the federal judiciary was never delegated the authority
"fully' 1 3 to redress that violation. There is no reason, other than
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973) (state legislatures have wide discretion in devising systems
of taxation and education; the Court lacks the expertise and familiarity with local problems
necessary to deal with these issues); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971) (lower court
erred in overturning state apportionment scheme "without solid constitutional or equitable
grounds for doing so").
100. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
101. See text accompanying note 285 infra.
102. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976); see notes 104 & 305
infra.
103. For a discussion of the significance of the degree of redress to be achieved, see text
accompanying notes 255-85 infra.
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professional or institutional shortsightedness, to shrink from this
thought. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution has
vested neither Congress with the power fully to regulate commerce
under all circumstances, 10 4 nor the President with full power to
104. Just as the judiciary is granted the authority to decide cases "arising under the
Constitution," Congress is granted the legislative authority to regulate interstate commerce.
The power to regulate commerce, like the power to decide constitutional cases, can threaten
underlying constitutional structures. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), the Supreme Court held that the application of the minimum wage and hours
requirements of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees did not "comport
with the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 852. The Court
referred to the impact that such regulation could have on state policy, but did not rest the
decision on "particularized assessments of actual impact" because, in any event, the regulation
would "significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee
relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health ....
These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments. . . .Indeed, it
is functions such as these which governments are created to provide. . . .If Congress may
withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions
upon which their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think there would
be little left of the States' 'separate and independent existence.'" Id. at 851. Thus, although
the regulation of wages and hours was assumed to fall within Congress' authority over
interstate commerce, the implied constitutional protection of the effective functioning of the
states in the federal system was "an affirmative limitation" on the power expressly granted
Congress. Id. at 841.
If constitutional structure affirmatively limits the commerce power, it must also limit the
authority of the federal judiciary. Although there is no reason to assume that the express
legislative power over commerce is somehow inferior to the express judicial power to decide
cases arising under the Constitution, the Court, within months of deciding National League of
Cities and with considerable nonchalance, rejected any such parity in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347 (1976). Elrod involved the method of staffing a county sheriff's office, the duties of which
presumably are similar to those of the police referred to in National League of Cities, a
function "which governments were created to provide." National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976). Despite National League of Cities' finding that Congress had
threatened the "separate and independent existence" of the states when it set minimum wages
and hours for such employees, the Court in Elrod rejected any such limitation on its own
authority partially to control methods of appointment to such positions: "More fundamental-
ly, however, . . there can be no impairment of executive power, whether on the state or
federal level, where actions pursuant to that power are impermissible under the Constitution.
Where there is no power, there can be no impairment of power." 427 U.S. at 352. The same
logic applied in National League of Cities would have required the conclusion that control over
wages and hours of state and local employees was not an impairment of state authority at all.
State actions inconsistent with federal standards would have been seen as impermissible
violations of the constitutional grant to Congress of authority over interstate commerce,
supported by the supremacy clause. Therefore, under the logic of Elrod, there was no conflict
between federal and state power at all in National League of Cities.
The gaping inconsistency between the two cases was acknowledged by Chief Justice
Burger, who suggested in his dissent in Elrod that the first amendment neither "requires nor
justifies" the Court's "inroads on the powers of the States to manage their own affairs. . . [as
defined by] the powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment." 427 U.S. at 375-76. This
inconsistency demonstrates the powerful present need for the judiciary to reassess its assump-
tions regarding the definition of its own function with respect to the states. Regardless of its
conclusions about the extent to which the judicial power exercised in Elrod threatened the
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conduct wars successfully, even though he is commander in chief. 105
Indeed, the judiciary has limited its own authority to protect effec-
tively the constitutional rights to privacy, 106 and even free speech, 10 7
because of the competing structural limitation represented by the
power of Congress to act within its legitimate sphere.
Fully redressing violations of constitutional rights may often
require the efforts of more than one branch of government, particu-
larly if "redress" is defined broadly enough. If detailed standards
need to be adopted and executive officers need to be employed to
protect the people's rights, the Constitution provides the appropri-
ate mechanisms, and it is not unimaginable that some of those
mechanisms do not lie within the "judicial Power." The federal
legislature and executive can and have supplemented the powers of
the judiciary in order more fully to protect constitutional rights. 10 8
If neither Congress nor the executive has the legal authority in a
particular instance to supplement the judicial remedy, then the
desired remedy simply constitutes a form or degree of redress that
the Constitution does not authorize. 10 9 If neither Congress nor the
executive nor the state institutions have the will to cooperate with
the judiciary to achieve the degree or form of redress desired by the
court, then it is entirely possible that the court's objective is unwise.
The great structural divisions of power in the Constitution were,
after all, designed on the assumption that no single decisionmaker
should be trusted. 110
The dimensions of what is being suggested must be understood.
The issue is not whether federal courts can authoritatively declare
federal law nor whether they can take action to redress violations of
that law. The issue is whether the principle of separation of powers
defines relevant, and perhaps even flexible, limits to the judiciary's
unilateral power to seek complete correction of the consequences of
essential functioning of the states, the Court should have acknowledged the underlying truth
of the decisional principle in National League of Cities: The extent of the express powers must
be limited by the underlying constitutional structure. One aspect of that structure is that the
states and the people are protected from the exercise of the courts' power to try cases in a way
that impermissibly combines its functions with those of the other branches.
105. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
106. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
107. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
108. This, of course, was the case with regard to school desegregation. See R. KLUGER,
SIMPLE JusTIcF (1976); text accompanying notes 304-05 infra.
109. This possibility is unlikely in light of Congress' power under § 5 of the 14th
amendment. See note 305 infra.
110. See notes 46-62 & 68-70 supra and accompanying texts.
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a constitutional violation. Although "the moralist will find it difficult
to sacrifice his aims in favor of structure and process," structure and
process are "the essence of the theory and practice of
constitutionalism."111
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
The purpose of this Part is to identify the underlying separation
of powers principles that the Supreme Court has used to define the
functional limits of each of the branches of the federal government.
Because these principles will be applied in Part III to the problem of
limiting judicial remedies, it is necessary to explain the assumption
that the judicial inquiries underlying the separation of powers doc-
trine and applied to the executive and legislative branches also
should be applied consistently to the judicial branch.
In re Debs112 represents judicial approval of an unusually danger-
ous combination of functions in the federal courts.113 The use of the
"labor injunction"'1 4 involved the courts in policymaking and
policy-implementing functions, as well as in its own adjudicatory
function, against union strikers. In contrast, Ex parte Milligan115
represents an important effort by the Supreme Court to restrain the
President from assuming both the legislative power to establish
courts and the judicial power to try cases. 116 Because both cases
involved significant pressures to ignore constitutional limitations-
extreme labor unrest and the Civil War-the Court's widely differ-
ing responses are important illustrations of why the Court needs to
be restrained by the same structural limitations that it imposes on
the other branches. The Court's justification for the combination of
functions approved in Debs depended largely on its departure from
the standards that it previously had set for limiting the power of the
President in Milligan.
In restricting the executive authority to adjudicate, the Milligan
Court had relied on the fact that the normal courts were open and
functioning.117 The Debs Court acknowledged that Congress was
functioning and could have legislated against the enjoined behavior,
111. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 30 (1975).
112. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
113. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
114. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 17.
115. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867).
116. Id. at 121, 125 (President may not give a military commission the power to try a
civilian in an area removed from the war zone).
117. Id. at 122.
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but blandly concluded that legislative action was not the "only reme-
dy.""18 Furthermore, although in Milligan the Court was realistically
skeptical of the President's arguments that reliance on the normal
judicial process would be futile, 119 the Debs Court argued that en-
largement of its own contempt powers was necessary because re-
liance on normal jury trials might be ineffective to protect the flow
of commerce. 120 Such explanatory inconsistencies are not merely
inelegant; they serve to release the judiciary from the structural
constraints that, when applied to the other branches, help to main-
tain the constitutional order. Thus, consistent application of doc-
trine might help to correct for institutional shortsightedness on the
part of the judiciary when it defines the limits of its own function.
In order to identify the underlying separation of powers princi-
ples that traditionally have defined the functional limits of each
branch of government and that could help define the proper rela-
tionship between the federal courts and state governments, the
relationship between "separation of powers" and "checks and bal-
ances" must be examined. It is almost an American tradition not
only to confuse the doctrines, but also to conclude that the success of
"checks and balances" makes reliance on separation of powers un-
necessary.
The two concepts are somewhat contradictory in substance and
derivation but are consistent in purpose. Both doctrines were
conceived as mechanisms for preventing tyrannical use of power. 121
Separation of powers relies on the implementation of an "intellectu-
al distinction" among the three major functions of government to
achieve this purpose;122 accordingly, the relevant case law is replete
with assertions that the branches of government must be kept dis-
tinct and each must not interfere with the functioning of the
others. 123 In contrast, the doctrine of checks and balances buttresses
the conceptual distinctions among the functions of government by
providing for direct intervention by each branch into the function-
ing of the others; 124 power can be checked only if it is shared.
Separation of powers has populist, democratic antecedents, while
checks and balances derives from aristocratic and elitist influ-
118. 158 U.S. at 581-82.
119. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22.
120. 158 U.S. at 582.
121. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 51 (J. Madison).
122. M. VILE, supra note 14, at 146.
123. See cases cited in notes 161 & 162 infra.
124. M. VILE, supra note 14, at 18; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 51 (J. Madison).
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ences.125 For historical, pragmatic and conceptual reasons, Ameri-
can scholars have tended to favor a theory of constitutional balance
over the theory of separation of powers.
A. Historical Bases
The framers of the Constitution reacted against their experi-
ences with a number of state constitutions that had relied too heavily
on a conceptual separation of functions, a reliance that resulted in
an inability to restrain state legislatures that often acted as demo-
cratic despots. 126 The early constitutions had created weak execu-
tives that did not share in legislative policymaking either through
the veto power or the power to exercise discretionary authority.127
The more radically democratic states also had weak judiciaries with-
out the power of judicial review.' 28 Two states even viewed the
power to impeach as an unacceptable blurring of functions. 129 The
Convention of 1787 reacted against these and other similar defects
in the Articles of Confederation' 0 by supplementing the separation
of functions with mechanisms to check legislative power. 131 Thus the
President was to share important appointive and foreign affairs
powers with the legislature. 132 Moreover, the executive was to have a
limited veto power, 33 and some assumed the judiciary would exer-
cise the power of judicial review. 1s4
Although the central contribution of the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787 was its unique insistence on both separation and balan-
cing of functions, the Convention did not reject, but rather supple-
mented, the fundamental concept of separation of powers. Indeed,
125. M. ViLE, supra note 14, at 136-39.
126. "But anarchy and the breakdown of government that it connoted no longer seemed
an accurate way to describe all of what was happening in the 1780's. An excess of power in the
people was leading not simply to licentiousness but to a new kind of tyranny, not by the
traditional rulers, but by the people themselves-. . . a theoretical contradiction .. " G.
WOOD, supra note 68, at 404. See M. VILE, supra note 14, at 143-75; Corwin, The Progress of
Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia
Convention, 30 AM. HIsT. Rav. 511 (1925).
127. M. VILF, supra note 14, at 134-75.
128. Id. at 138-75.
129. Id. at 142.
130. See generally Wright, The Origins of the Separation of Powers in America, 13 EcONOM-
ICA 169, 179-80 (1933).
131. M. VIE, supra note 14, at 153-57; G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 550.
132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
133. Id. art. I, § 7.
134. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 9 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER]; R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
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some of the major structural changes, such as the decision to elect
the executive and the legislature separately and the decision to vest
more appointment authority in the executive, are better described
as efforts to separate functions than to merge them. 135 Nevertheless,
scholars have seized upon the historical emphasis on balance to
minimize the need for an abstract differentiation of functions. 136
The framers' method of restricting power through a specific,
limited sharing of functions could be construed as additional evi-
dence of the importance of maintaining a general separation of
functions. That is, because the framers specified where functions
should be shared, separation might be implied wherever the text
does not explicitly require concurrence. The Supreme Court some-
times has relied on this rule of construction. 137 The other bases for
academic skepticism, however, cast considerable doubt that this rule,
even if theoretically correct, is useful in deciding real cases.
B. Pragmatic Bases
Some scholars have argued that the doctrine of checks and
balances vests in all three branches of the government the real
authority to define the appropriate limit of power.' Because a
definition of function necessarily is implicit in the exercise of
concurrent powers such as treaty formation or the appointment
process, "the institutions of the Presidency and Congress must bear
primary responsibility for drawing many jurisdictional lines."' 3 9
This is a pragmatic conclusion because effective political power does
reside in the executive and legislative branches, and many separa-
tion of powers issues are, in fact, resolved by the political process.
Standing alone, however, this argument fails to distinguish separa-
tion of powers decisions from other constitutional decisions. For
example, because Congress may legislate in areas that might affect
first amendment rights, it surely has the initial responsibility to
135. See generally M. VILE, supra note 14, at 18, 119-75; G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 519-
64; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 67, 68, 75, 76 (A. Hamilton); Sharp, The ClassicalAmerican Doctrine
of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 396 (1935). The Supreme Court has
acknowledged very recently that separation of powers was central to the thinking of the
framers. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976). For a comparison between the appointment
power under the Articles of Confederation and those under the Constitution, see Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 110 (1926).
136. See, e.g., Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 218-19. See also Levi, supra note 17.
137. See cases cited in notes 161 & 162 infra.
138. See Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 216-19; Levi, supra note 17, at 386-91.
139. Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 214.
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determine that its legislation is consistent with those rights. 140 But it
does not follow that the judiciary should not review such deci-
sions.14 1 Indeed, to the extent that an aggressive use of judicial
review in other areas is justified as an effort to protect the integrity
of the political process, 142 there is no reason in principle why the
Court should enforce separation of powers principles any less dili-
gently. The integrity of the process, including the need to preserve
democratic accountability, is equally at stake when federal courts
assume state executive and legislative roles.
The argument for a limited judicial function in applying separa-
tion of powers also rests, however, on a fundamental distrust of the
doctrine itself. Formal application of separation of powers has been
viewed as a threat to the effective functioning of government. De-
scribed as "mechanistic" and unrealistic, 143 a conceptual application
of the doctrine is thought to threaten such modern necessities as a
strong executive branch and independent administrative agen-
cies. 144 In short, there is some tendency in American political
thought to supplement the framers' accommodation between sep-
140. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 15-31, 44-46 (f975).
141. "The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are
the political or confidential agents of the ex&utive, merely to execute the will of the President,
or rather to act in cases in which the executive professes a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear, than that their acts are only politically examinable. But
where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance
of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who considers himself injured, has a
right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy. ... Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
142. "Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. ... Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (announcing the one-person-one-vote rule). In the Carolene
Products footnote, the Court included protecting the-integrity of the political process among
the areas that might justify aggressive or "strict" judicial review. United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("It is unnecessary to consider now whether
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legisla-
tion."). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 592-94. The justification for aggressive judicial
intervention when legislation restricts the political process-because the political process must
ordinarily be relied upon to repeal undesirable legislation-is equally applicable to justify
strict scrutiny of lower federal courts' violations of separation of powers: A district court's
unwise constitutional mandate is even more irreversible by the political process than is
undesirable legislation passed by a corrupt political process.
143. See Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 215 (quoting K. LOWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER
AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1965)).
144. Id. at 217. See also W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOvERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (1885).
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
aration and balance by simply substituting the power politics of
checks and balances for the "parchment barriers" 145 of an intellectu-
al, court-enforced separation of functions. This tendency is as evi-
dent now in the innovations in the scope of federal judicial relief as
it once was in the innovation of the independent administrative
agencies. Thus Professor Chayes and others defend new forms of
judicial activism partly on the ground that the courts have been
effective in achieving important policy objectives for many groups
that have been relatively powerless in the political process. 146 The
pragmatists urge, with equanimity, even eagerness, that the adapta-
tion of the judiciary into a new and more forceful institution should
be awaited and studied; the effectiveness of the new institution, not
a priori arguments, should control the response of the other
branches to this phenomenon. 147
Highly effective measures, however, can be unconstitutional
nevertheless. Some constitutional doctrines, including separation of
powers, were designed in part to make government less efficient, 148
and they cannot be disregarded merely because they have their
intended effect. The pragmatic American political tradition treats
separation of powers as a special case, however, because that tradi-
tion also doubts that "separation of powers" really means anything.
C. Conceptual Bases
If there is no way to distinguish judicial, legislative and executive
functions, separation of powers must be recast as an admonition to
maintain three different departments of government-"not a gov-
ernment of separated powers, but rather a government of separated
institutions sharing powers."' 49 The classical identification of sepa-
rate functions appears to be too simplistic. This identification was
based primarily on the purpose with which power is exercised: 150 If
the purpose was to set policy prospectively, the power was labeled
"legislative"; if to implement those policies, it was "executive"; and if
to adjudicate whether specific behavior violated those policies, it was
"judicial" power. Secondarily, the classical identifications relied on
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
146. E.g., Chayes, supra note 2; Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of Public Interest
Litigation, 54 N.C.L. Rnv. 1133 (1976).
147. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307-09.
148. See M. VILE, supra note 14, at 10. See also material cited in note 126 supra.
149. Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 218-19.
150. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 185-90 (tent. ed. 1958); M. VILE, supra note 14, at 16-17; Frohnmay-
er, supra note 22, at 218.
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the methods of exercising power.151 Legislative decisions were
thought to require predictive, value-laden judgments; executive
decisions, to involve the implementation of legislative ends by a
practical choice of means; judicial decisions, to require a judgment
regarding past events that involved two or more parties whose legal
rights and remedies turned on an application of the law to their
behavior.
It is now clearly understood that a merging of functions is both
desirable and unavoidable. The reasons for this unavoidable merg-
ing are varied. The delegated powers are not, of course, entirely
defined, and therefore it is difficult to know when one branch is
encroaching on the powers of another. 15 2 For example, the extent to
which the executive power was intended to involve discretionary
authority, whether in foreign or domestic policy, is a subject of
continuing debate.' 53 Even were the character of the delegated
powers certain, the Constitution specifically provides for some
concurrent exercise of powers.' 54 The executive veto power, of
course, is descriptively legislative and the Senate's power to approve
specific appointments is descriptively executive. Finally, even were
the powers not specifically concurrent, the exercise of any of the
delegated powers necessarily involves some of the purposes and
methods of decisionmaking indigenous to one of the other
branches. 155 Executive "adjudication," such as terminating entitle-
ments, occurs every day; courts make policy and control executive
behavior by deciding cases; legislatures need the descriptively judi-
cial contempt power to gather information necessary for legisla-
ting.156 Therefore, the mere fact that one branch utilizes the pur-
poses or methods of another branch is not sufficient to find a
violation of separation of powers.
Moreover, even if a descriptive application of the doctrine were
feasible, it is impossible to keep the separate functions of each
branch from "interfering" with the functioning of the other
branches because each branch constitutionally is entitled to influ-
151. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 150. See also Chayes, supra note 2;
Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 218; Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative
Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 401, 403-11 (1975).
152. Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 218-20.
153. Id. at 220 & n.35. See generally Symposium: Separation of Powers, 52 IND. L.J. 311
(1977).
154. Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 217.
155. Id. at 216-17; Parker, The Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers
and Judicial Supremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 449 (1958).
156. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
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ence the others profoundly. By its very nature, an executive pardon
frustrates the legislative and judicial branches.15 7 The congressional
authority to control the jurisdiction of the courts can, in effect,
decide cases, 158 and its authority to organize and set policy for
executive offices similarly controls their functioning. 159 Similarly,
the judicial decree can and does control the operation of the other
branches.
In short, the two assumptions underlying separation of powers-
that functions can be distinguished abstractly and that any one
branch can be kept from interfering with the others-appear un-
realistic. Therefore, the impulse is strong to rely instead on the
political capacity of each branch to control the others. That capacity
depends only slightly, if at all, on the first assumption and not at all
on the second.
The pragmatic tradition, however, is at odds with almost two
centuries of Supreme Court adjudication, for the Court, after all,
has managed throughout its history to apply the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers to specific controversies. The pragmatic tradition's
preference for balance rather than separation does not amend the
Constitution. Nevertheless, the conceptual criticisms of separation
of powers do provide useful insights for evaluating the established
judicial standards for its implementation. There is no avoiding the
conclusion that the standard articulations of the separation principle
are rather unsatisfactory when set against the arguments that func-
tional merging is inevitable. The following discussion indicates,
however, that a close examination of these doctrinal inadequacies
points to an underlying logic that is both sensible and usable.
1. The basic judicial standard.
The traditional judicial standard for implementing separation of
powers utilizes the defined function of each branch to delimit the
functions of the others. Kilbourn v. Thompson,160 in which the Court
restricted congressional investigations deemed "judicial" in nature,
contained a typical statement of this approach:
157. See Boudin, The Presidential Pardons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the
Limitations on the Pardon Power Been Exceeded?, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1976); text accompany-
ing notes 169-70 infra.
158. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953); text accompanying notes 166-68 infra.
159. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
160. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American
system of written constitutional law, that all the powers intrusted to
government, whether State or national, are divided into the three
grand departments. .... That the functions appropriate to each
of these branches of government shall be vested in a separate body
of public servants. . . .It is also essential to the successful working
of this system that the persons intrusted with power in any one of
these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers
confided to the others, but that each shall by the law of its creation
be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own
department and no other.' 61
This is, in a sense, a "hydraulic" model: The fluid nature and scope
of each branch's functions expand to fit circumstances until they
reach the limit set by a competing branch's function. This formula-
tion at least has the advantage of not limiting each branch to a rigid,
preconceived form. It acknowledges constitutionally mandated
merged functions only as "important exceptions."' 16
2
This traditional formulation is difficult to apply, however. Al-
though it validates, as it must, the legitimacy of such specified
exceptions as the veto and pardon powers, it does not provide
standards for identifying when the exercise of an overlapping pow-
er is excessive, nor even for identifying the boundary between two
generic functions. United States v. Klein 163 exemplifies the first of
these deficiencies. The conflict under examination in Klein was
between two overlapping sets of functions: the executive pardon
power, which overlaps the legislative function of prescribing punish-
ments, and the congressional power to determine judicial juris-
diction, which overlaps the judicial function of trying cases. The
Supreme Court held, first, 164 that although the President effectively
161. Id. at 190-91. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
529 (1935); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 116-20 (1926); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536-40 (1917); United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1872); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697,
700-03 (1864); cf. cases cited in note 84 supra (legislative power of taxation delimits judicial
authority); cases cited in notes 86-96 supra (case and controversy requirements).
162. E.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S.
521, 536 (1917); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 191 (1880); Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 515 (1880) (Field, Miller and Bradley,
JJ., concurring in the judgment).
163. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1872).
164. The Klein opinion apparently considered the legislative-judicial conflict first, and
only after holding the conditional removal of jurisdiction to be an unconstitutional legislative
incursion into the judicial role did the opinion go on to hold: "The rule prescribed is also liable
to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional
power of the Executive." Id. at 147 (emphasis added). See note 168 infra. The two separation
of powers conflicts are presented here in this order merely for descriptive convenience.
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had thwarted the legislative policy of punishing Civil War insur-
gents, Congress was without authority to limit the presidential par-
don power.165 The second functional conflict involved the congres-
sional specification of the method for proving the loyalty of South-
erners for purposes of regaining confiscated property, and the
enactment of a statute granting the Supreme Court appellate juris-
diction only to dismiss appeals when the judgment below rested on
other types of evidence of loyalty, including evidence of an execu-
tive pardon. 65 The statute would have controlled the outcome of
cases pending at the time it was passed, including Klein itself. 167 The
Court found that Congress had "prescribed a rule for the decision
of a cause in a particular way," and, therefore, had "passed the limit
which separates the legislative from the judicial power."'168
The significance of these two holdings is that they demonstrate
both the need for and the inadequacy of the traditional judicial
separation of powers standard. By its nature, the pardon power
must interfere with the general legislative power; the limit of the
pardon power, therefore, cannot be defined by identifying the
scope of the legislative power. Instead, the traditional judicial logic
followed in Klein sets the limit of the general legislative power by
identifying the scope of the exceptional power, here the pardon
power. The general and exceptional powers are descriptively alike,
however, so this formulation can permit the exception to swallow
the rule. If, as the Court held in Klein, the President can pardon
whole categories of people with such conditions as he wishes, and if,
as other cases indicate, he can do so even before indictment, 169 it is
difficult to distinguish the pardon power from the legislative power
165. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139-41.
166. Id. at 145.
167. Id. at 143.
168. Id. at 146-47. Another, perhaps preferable, explanation of Klein is that it held no
more than that it is unconstitutional for Congress to "bind the Court to decide a case in
accordance with a rule of law independently unconstitutional on other grounds." HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 134, at 316. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 56-57. On that
interpretation, the withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction was unconstitutional only because it
would require the Court to give effect to Congress' unconstitutional impairment of the
pardon. This interpretation does not rest on separation of legislative and judicial powers at all,
but merely on the narrow holding of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The
Klein opinion, however, clearly treated the case as involving two distinct separation of powers
issues, and the language even suggests that the consideration of the congressional impairment
of the pardon might be dicta. See note 164 supra. Furthermore, the Court has treated Klein as
a separation of powers case rather than a Marbuty issue. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
568 (1962). In any event, the Klein opinion is used here for illustrative purposes, and the
discussion is based on the Court's language.
169. E.g., Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1867).
[Vol. 30:661
FEDERAL EQUITABLE REMEDIES
to prescribe punishments, 170 at least whenever Congress prescribes
broader or more severe sanctions than the President desires.
The Klein Court's second holding responds to this need to limit
the "exceptional" constitutional checks, yet as a decisional principle
the traditional standard cannot explain the outcome. Of course, a
jurisdictional statute might affect the outcome of a pending case just
as it necessarily affects the outcomes of future cases. To this extent
the judicial power and the legislative powers overlap, and the hy-
draulic model would seem to require the subordination of the judi-
cial function to the exceptional legislative power to define juris-
diction. By its nature, the power to define jurisdiction affects case
outcomes and cannot be improper simply because it looks like the
judicial power in this respect.171
The difficulty in Klein is not that the Court attempted to limit
the exceptional power of Congress to affect case outcomes by re-
stricting jurisdiction. Without such limitation, the congressional
power over jurisdiction threatens the general judicial power it-
self,172 just as the pardon power as upheld in Klein appears to
threaten the general legislative function. Rather, the difficulty is
that the decisional principle cannot explain why the exceptional
power should be limited at all. If functions are generally independ-
ent, but not where the constitutional text requires merger, there is no
apparent limit to the exceptional power. That the exceptional power
appears to be identical to the more general power, which is the only
limit the traditional hydraulic model recognizes, is irrelevant when
powers are specified textually as concurrent. In short, the tradition-
al maxim by itself cannot explain which branch should prevail in a
conflict between concurrent powers.
The second problem with the traditional hydraulic model is that
it provides no real guidance even when the functions are not textu-
ally defined as overlapping. The generic, delegated powers are not
self-defining; the proper scope and means of executing such broad
170. See generally Boudin, supra note 157.
171. Indeed, Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), upheld a withdrawal of
appellate jurisdiction for habeas corpus, even as applied to a case in which the Court already
had granted jurisdiction for the appeal and had heard arguments on the merits. The Klein
Court did not even discuss McCardle. If the Klein-McCardle distinction is to be sustained on a
separation of powers rationale, it must hinge on the fact that Klein's withdrawal of jurisdiction
was conditioned upon a finding of fact, whereas the McCardle withdrawal of jurisdiction was
unconditioned. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568 (1962).
172. Cf. Hart, supra note 158, at 1363 (congressional power to limit jurisdiction difficult
to reconcile with "the basic presuppositions of a regime of law and of constitutional govern-
ment").
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powers as the "judicial Power" are open to reasonable differences of
opinion. It is not convincing, for example, to claim as the Court did
in Kilbournl73 that Congress cannot use the contempt power because
it is judicial in character. If Congress requires the contempt power
to conduct its legislative business, it is irrelevant that such power
"looks like" a judicial power, for that similarity merely indicates that
the power is held concurrently in some instances. In Kilbourn, the
Court attempted to avoid this difficulty by finding that the subject
under legislative inquiry was presently before the courts and there-
fore could be resolved only by the courts. 174 This finding was pa-
tently inconclusive because the same information may be relevant
both to a case before the courts and also to legislation being drafted
to prevent similar cases from arising in the future. It makes entirely
as much sense to state that in Kilbourn the judicial power to try cases
interfered with the legislative power to obtain information as it does
to argue the reverse. In short, the traditional model of limiting
functions by reference to the nature of the functions of the compet-
ing branches is question-begging unless there is some independent
method of establishing that the asserted functions are neither ex-
plicitly nor impliedly concurrent.
2. Internal and external functions.
Because the hydraulic model by itself cannot define the limits of
concurrently held functions, the courts have attempted to supple-
ment it with a distinction between the "internal" and "external"
exercise of such functions. The broadest example of the resulting
standard was the Jeffersonian argument for limitation of the power
of judicial review. These democrats argued that a shared function
should not be used by one branch so as to affect the coordinate
functioning of another branch. Specifically, they argued that each
branch should have "an equal right to decide for itself what is the
meaning of the constitution in the cases submitted to its action." 175
Taken to this extreme, the argument against the "external" applica-
tion of a shared function is authority for chaotic, continuing conflict
among the branches: 176 Within its own sphere, each branch could
act independently of the other branch's constitutional interpreta-
tions.
173. 103 U.S. 168, 192-93 (1880); see text accompanying note 160 supra.
174. 103 U.S. at 193.
175. Letter to Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, reprinted in X THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 140, 141 (P. Ford ed. 1899). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 26-31;
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. Rv. 1001, 1008 (1965).
176. M. VILE, supra note 14, at 164-75.
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A more limited version of the same distinction occasionally has
been adopted by the Court. For example, the Court suggested in
Michaelson v. United States177 that legislative authority to control the
judicial contempt power is narrower when that power is used to
assure orderly proceedings in the courtroom than when used to
enforce compliance with judicial decrees outside the courtroom. 178
Thus the location of the dividing line between the legislative and
judicial control over the contempt power was thought to depend in
part on whether the internal functions of the judiciary were im-
plicated. Similarly, the Court has suggested that the legislative
contempt power interferes less with the judicial function when the
legislature seeks merely to protect the internal integrity of its
committee proceedings. 179
The difficulty with the labels "internal" and "external" is that
they merely represent conclusions, not explanations of the scope of
governmental functions. A judicial contempt decree is not necessari-
ly less "internal" to the judicial function merely because the physical
location of the affected conduct is outside the courtroom. Indeed,
the object of a court's decree may not be "near" the legislative
proceeding either, yet in Michaelson control over conduct occurring
entirely outside any legislative proceedings apparently was thought
more "internal" to the legislative function than to the judicial. It is
entirely possible that essential aspects of a particular judicial func-
tion could depend on controlling behavior that is surely "internal" to
the executive function, such as compelling disclosure of secret presi-
dential conversations.180 The exercise of the veto renders one "inter-
nal" legislative vote futile 'and partially controls the procedures
within the legislative branch for the next vote; the judicial equity
power is useless unless the actual behavior of executive officers
engaging in clearly executive functions can be coerced. The differ-
ent governmental departments necessarily must affect the internal
177. 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
178. Id. at 66-67. The Court held that the power of contempt is an inherent judicial
power but that Congress in the Clayton Act had properly restricted this power because its
restrictions applied only to acts also punishable as crimes and not to acts committed in the
presence of the court.
179. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521,542-44 (1917); see Doe v. McMillan, 412 US. 306
(1973) (distinguishing between dissemination of material within Congress and outside
Congress, for purposes of determining subordinate legislative employees' liability for invasion
of privacy).
180. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (President's generalized interest in
confidentiality of conversations outweighed by fundamental demands of due process in the
fair administration of criminal justice). See text accompanying notes 195-99 infra.
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operations of the other branches because the checks imposed by the
Constitution cannot be effective unless they have an "external"
impact.
3. Essential and nonessential functions.
If it is not possible to distinguish meaningfully between internal
and external functions, it still might be possible to distinguish be-
tween interferences that only "check" a coordinate branch and those
that threaten its existence. Madison at one point construed Montes-
quieu to mean not that agencies should have "no partial agency in, or
• . .controul over, the acts of each other," but that "where the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution, are subverted.' '181
On its face, this proposition appears insufficient for deciding any
imaginable case, because only the virtual elimination of one branch
by another amounts to a violation of the rule. If the extreme Jeffer-
sonian argument against "interference" was in fact an attack on the
idea of a balanced Constitution, 182 Madison's formulation was an
uncharacteristic attack on the idea of separation of powers itself.
The argument requires separate institutions but not separate func-
tions. Nevertheless, a variant of this position has found its way into
judicial standards. Courts have designated some functions as "essen-
tial" and have limited the scope of a shared function when it inter-
feres with such an essential function. Justice Story asserted in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 183 for example, that congressional authority to
determine jurisdiction could not be used to interfere with the essen-
tial judicial role. 184
It is debatable how much jurisdiction is "essential," but similar
statements regarding essential functions have been accepted with
respect to the powers of the other branches. In Myers v. United
States, 185 for example, the Court held that the power to remove
postmasters is essential to seeing that the laws are faithfully executed
and therefore is an essential executive function protected from
181. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
182. See notes 175-76 supra and accompanying text.
183. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
184. "The judicial power must, therefore, be vested in some court, by Congress; and to
suppose that it was not an obligation binding on them, but might, at their pleasure, be omitted
or declined, is to suppose that, under the sanction of the constitution they might defeat the
constitution itself." Id. at 329.
185. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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legislative incursion.18 6
Despite the Court's protection of these essential functions, the
framers may have intended to give each branch some power over
the essential functioning of the others. Whatever the precise limits
of such checks and balances as the veto power, the impeachment
power, the subpoena power, the power of judicial review, the power
to appropriate money, and the power to control the method of
executive appointments, it is at least certain that each empowers one
branch to interfere fundamentally with the powers of another
branch-surely more fundamentally than the power to approve the
removal of a postmaster interferes with the executive function.18 7
Although limitations on the scope of constitutional checks and bal-
ances must be determined somehow, the "essentialness" of the func-
tion interfered with is as much a measure of the effectiveness of the
constitutional "check" as it is proof of a violation of separation of
powers.
4. The Jackson formulation.
Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case18 8 repre-
sents another effort to develop judicial standards for the application
of separation of powers. He contended that the extent of presiden-
tial powers fluctuates "depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress."' 8 9 According to this view,
executive power is most legitimate when explicitly or implicitly au-
thorized by Congress; its legitimacy is most indeterminate when
exercised in the face of congressional silence because it then relies
only on inherent presidential authority; and it is least legitimate
when asserted in the face of congressional opposition, for then the
President can prevail only by maintaining that Congress is acting
beyond its authority.
The primary organizing criterion in this framework is the extent
to which the branches agree on how to allocate power: The degree
of judicial scrutiny varies according to the extent of agreement
between the executive and legislature. In this respect, the proposal
does not utilize a descriptive differentiation of function and thus is
186. Id. at 117.
187. Professor Black has commented that, on the basis of constitutional text, Congress
"could cut the President down to nothing but his salary, could, indeed, put the White House
up for auction," to which his co-author could only respond: "It could take the clerks away
from the Supreme Court." B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, THE TIDES oF PowER 6 (1976).
188. Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
189. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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responsive to the reality of political outcomes rather than to the
theory of separation of powers. The political outcome may be influ-
enced by each branch's concept of the proper functions of the
competing branch, but Justice Jackson's formula does not assist any
branch in determining proper allocations. It merely assures each
branch that its judgment will influence the level of judicial scrutiny.
To the extent that the Jackson formulation acknowledges factors
other than the extent of agreement among the branches, it slides
over the difficult separation of powers problems. For example,
although the rule states that executive authority is "at its maximum"
when the President acts with congressional approval, it fails to indi-
cate when this authority would exceed both its inherent scope and
what Congress "can delegat."'190 To say that only rarely would the
executive exceed both his authority and what Congress can au-
thorize is not to explain how to identify it when it occurs. 191 More-
over, when the President acts in the face of congressional silence, the
formulation explicitly commits the outcome to "the imperatives of
events" rather than to any effort to differentiate functions. 192
Only in the third category, when there is disagreement between
the executive and legislative branches regarding proper power allo-
cation, does the formulation face the problem of functional differ-
entiation. Here Justice Jackson assumes that the constitutional text
will give adequate guidance to identify when one branch has ex-
ceeded the limits of a concurrently held power, such as the war
power. Although the phrases "commander in chief" and "to raise
and support armies" are suggestive, they are by no means conclu-
sive. 193 Moreover, even to the extent that reliance on text is persua-
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("If the Joint ['Tonkin Gulf'] Resolution purports to give the Chief
Executive authority to commit United States forces to armed conflict limited in scope only by
his own absolute discretion, is the Resolution a constitutionally impermissible delegation of all
or part of Congress' power to declare war?"); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 693 (1862)
(Nelson, J., dissenting) (the power to declare civil war "cannot be delegated or surrendered to
the Executive").
One commentator essentially adopted the Jackson formulation: "[A]ny attempt to brand
particular conflicts as constitutional or unconstitutional is likely to be of little consequence.
The constitutional analysis is better viewed as yielding a working directive to the executive and
legislative branches that the commitment of the country to war be accomplished only through
the closest collaboration possible, rather than an automatic formula for condemning or
approving particular presidential action." Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit
Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1771, 1794 (1968).
192. 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
193. See generally Frohnmayer, supra note 22, at 219-20. President Nixon stated that the
War Powers Resolution of 1973, 87 Stat. 555, H.R.J. Res. 542, -93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG.
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sive, it does not necessarily utilize the underlying character of the
functions to separate the great powers of government. There re-
mains something compelling about Justice Black's apparently naive
explanation that the President could not seize private steel mills
because the "Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking pow-
er to the Congress alone."'194
D. Comparative Functional Differentiation: United States v. Nixon
Although each of the articulated judicial standards by itself is an
inadequate general formulation of separation of powers, together
they suggest that abstract differentiation of function can be useful in
defining the limits of express or implied concurrent powers. Under-
lying the articulated standards is a reasoned response to the dilem-
ma of two contradictory structural principles in the Constitution:
The principle of separation requires that the branches be independ-
ent and coordinate; the principle of balance requires that the
branches be dependent on and, to some indeterminate extent, sub-
ordinateto each other. Where neither constitutional text nor history
provides definitive guidance to the limits of a concurrent power, the
dual requirements of separation and balance have been reconciled
through an abstract functional differentiation that locates the
boundary that least restricts the power of each branch. This resolu-
tion assumes that in any conflict each branch makes equal claims to
the contradictory goals of autonomy and interference. It assumes
that both claims for the right to "check" the other branch cannot be
validated because they are inconsistent. Consequently, the only basis
for separation is to identify the division of power that least reduces
the general power of each branch, thus maximizing the potential in
each of the competing branches for both independent action and
interference. The following proposition summarizes this general
and implicit standard used by the Court to give the greatest possible
effect to two inconsistent organizational principles: With respect to
two inconsistent claims for power, deny the claim that represents the
greater intrusion into, but not necessarily a more effective "check"
REC. 36,198 (1973), was unconstitutional because it automatically would terminate his
"constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief" if Congress failed within 60 days to declare
war or extend the period after commitment of forces to combat. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES VETOING HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542, A JOINT RESOLUTION
CONCERNING THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 171, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3; 119 CONG. REc. 34,990 (1973).
194. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 589
(1952).
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of, the classically or textually defined function of the competing
branch.
This proposition is illustrated by United States v. Nixon,195 in
which the President claimed that his inherent power to maintain the
secrecy of presidential conversations must prevail over the
judiciary's power to subpoena information relevant to a criminal
trial. Descriptively, each branch's claim easily falls within its de-
cisionmaking powers: The Court described its subpoena power as
"essential" to the classical judicial function of determining guilt or
innocence; 196 similarly, it acknowledged an inherent executive pow-
er to maintain the confidentiality of communications as an essential
part of executive decisionmaking. 197 Nonetheless, these two classic
purposes-to decide cases and to operate the machinery of govern-
ment-necessarily involve each branch in the functions of the other:
The President's actions can affect the guilt-determination process,
and the Court's role can affect the process of operating the govern-
ment. The claims are inconsistent and both cannot be validated-the
President cannot maintain the confidentiality of his conversations
while a court is using them as evidence. The principle of balance,
which relies on the sharing of functions among the branches, cannot
resolve-such inconsistent claims. Moreover, the traditional hydraulic
separation of powers model is of no apparent use because to assert
that the executive function can extend only to the point at which it
usurps judicial functions equally implies the opposite assertion that
the judiciar function must yield when it usurps executive functions.
Finally, neither the process of adjudication nor the process of presi-
dential decisionmaking can be described meaningfully as external or
nonessential.
The Court decided Nixon primarily by acknowledging the equal-
ity of the competing claims and by finding the least restrictive means
of reconciling the powers of both branches. This was accomplished
by comparing the relative degrees of intrusions into the classically
defined functions of the competing branches. Thus the Court ad-
mitted the power of the chief executive to withhold information
from the judicial process, 198 as well as the power of the Court to
compel disclosure. Both prerogatives were approved with the qual-
ification that the general authority of each branch would be permit-
195. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
196. Id. at 711.
197. Id. at 708.
198. Id. at 705-06.
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ted to interfere with the operations of the competing branch only if
supported by a preponderance of specific need, defined with refer-
ence to the classically defined functions at stake in the specific
conflict. This rule explains the conclusion in Nixon that the "general-
ized assertion" of executive privilege must yield to the "demon-
strated, specific need for evidence" in the criminal trial.199
The Court's demand for proof of specific institutional need for
claimed authority suggests two interrelated types of functional
comparisons that are relevant to assessing the relative degree of
intrusion into the opposite branch's function: comparisons of the
depth and breadth of the intrusions. The first is a more abstract
inquiry into the quality of the governmental purpose inherent in
each competing claim for power, and the second is a more practical
inquiry into actual operational impact of the claims on the compet-
ing branch.
The relative depth of the intrusions in Nixon was measured by
how directly and persuasively each claimed power was related to the
classically or textually defined purposes of that branch of govern-
ment. The claim represented by the highly specific subpoena was
persuasively related to the classical judicial purpose of trying crimi-
nal cases. The highly general claim of executive secrecy was less
clearly related to the executive purpose of operating the machinery
of government. A more specific executive claim, such as one based
on the need for military secrecy, might be more convincingly related
to executive functions, and the Court noted that such a claim might
require a different result.200 To the extent that the executive power
claimed in Nixon was so general as not to be plausibly or closely
related to a legitimate executive purpose, denying the President's
claim would intrude less into the executive function than denying
the subpoena power would intrude into the judicial function of
trying cases.
The demand for proof of specific institutional need also suggests
that the relative degree of the intrusion can be measured by the
breadth of the intrusion into the actual operations of the competing
branch. An undifferentiated institutional need is more likely to be
199. "[W]hen the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed material sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 710, 712 n.19.
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claimed frequently. The subpoena in Nixon specified exact informa-
tion required for a specific criminal case; such claims for executive
information are unlikely to be made frequently. The Court noted
that such "infrequent occasions of disclosure" would not be likely to
cause presidential advisors "to temper the candor of their re-
marks."201 In contrast, generalized claims of executive privilege
could be asserted over a broad range of circumstances and thus
intrude frequently into the judicial function.
It should be noted that the Court in Nixon only denied finality to
the relatively broad claim of the executive branch. The Nixon stand-
ard requires that the losing claim be subordinated only to the
minimum extent necessary to resolve the conflict between the
branches. 202 Thus, Nixon does not prevent the President from clas-
sifying documents for purposes of secrecy nor from, in effect, "ad-
judicating" whether they appear necessary for the criminal trial in
the first instance. The President's claim of privilege is "presumptive-
ly" valid before the district court.203 In short, the President is per-
mitted to share the adjudicatory responsibility, but his decision is
subordinate to the final decision of the courts. The sharing of the
methods and purposes of decisionmaking is prevented only to the
extent that one of the asserted powers must yield, and then only to
the minimum extent necessary to resolve the conflict between the
branches.
Nixon, then, is a refined application of all four of the traditional
judicial standards for separation of powers. It adopts the hydraulic
assumption that the power of each branch is delimited by the func-
tion of the competing branch. The "essentialness" of the function is
relevant as a comparative measure of the degree of intrusion into
each branch's function, considered in the abstract. The distinction
between "internal" and "external" uses of power is restated as a
more general inquiry into the comparative degree of intrusion into
the actual operations of each branch. The Jackson formulation is
201. Id. at 712.
202. Some claims might be so broad that merely granting finality to the more appropri-
ate branch would not prevent an overbroad intrusion. For example, an executive claim of the
power to make rules for the general public, without any guidance at all from the legislature,
might be too broad even if such rules were expressly subject to legislative "veto." To permit
the President so to dominate the legislative agenda would amount rather clearly to a reversal
of functions, so the mere preservation of final authority to Congress would not be sufficient.
See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
203. 418 U.S. at 713.
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followed insofar as it suggests that the authority of one branch
should not be invalidated unless there is an actual conflict with
another branch, and then only to the minimum extent necessary to
resolve the conflict.
The Nixon Court's methods of inquiry into the relative degrees
of intrusion use the traditional judicial standards in a way that
reconciles the competing doctrines of checks and balances and sep-
aration of powers. The power of each branch to "check" the other is
not denied, and the Court acknowledged that the necessary interfer-
ence might be significant. Thus a specified and substantiated claim
of executive privilege might be upheld despite its direct interference
with essential judicial functions. 2°4 The Court also acknowledged
the significance of the judicial intrusion into the privacy of the
presidential decisionmaking process. 205 In these ways, the decision is
faithful to the concept of constitutional balance by acknowledging
equal claims to overlapping authority. Yet it also responds to the
obvious necessity for drawing some limit for the exercise of inconsis-
tent, concurrent powers by expanding the power of each branch in a
way least likely to interfere deeply and broadly with the classically
defined functions of the other branch. To this extent, the decision is
faithful to the concept of separation of powers.
E. The Traditional Judicial Standards Reevaluated
Previous cases are more understandable in light of the separa-
tion of powers formulation that emerges from Nixon. The general
hydraulic rule that no branch shall "encroach upon the powers
confided to the others"20 6 except according to specific constitutional
exceptions is overgeneralized but not useless. The classically defined
core of each branch's general functions can be used to mark the limit
of the other branch's powers when two asserted powers are inconsis-
tent and when the exercise of one such power would intrude more
deeply and broadly into the competing branch's sphere than would
the exercise of the other. An example is United States v. Klein,20 7
which held that Congress had exceeded its power to prescribe regu-
lations for the Court's appellate power when it proscribed appellate
jurisdiction of cases where proof of loyalty to the Union had been
based on an executive pardon.20 8 The Court, of course, acknowl-
204. Id. at 710, 712 n.19.
205. Id. at 705-06, 714-15.
206. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880). See text accompanying notes 160-
61 supra.
207. 80 U.S. (13 Wal.) 128 (1872).
208. See text accompanying notes 163-68 supra.
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edged the power of Congress to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction but found that a conditional use of this power en-
croached on the judicial power to determine facts in a pending case
when its purpose was "to deny to pardons granted by the President
the effect which this court had adjudged them to have. '20 9 The
judiciary claimed only the right to find facts and decide pending
cases according to applicable law-a claim that carves from
Congress' "jurisdiction" only cases already pending at the time it
legislates.210 Congress essentially had asserted the power to pre-
scribe a rule of decision in a pending case.211 The judicial claim left
Congress with its normal power to regulate jurisdiction uncondi-
tionally for nonpending cases. Moreover, although affecting the
outcome of cases is necessarily a legislative function to the extent
that it is a necessary result of regulating jurisdiction, the power to
determine the outcome of pending cases by manipulating jurisdiction
is not necessary to the general function of controlling jurisdiction.
At least, it is less closely related to that function than the judicial role
of applying existing law to specific cases is related to the classical
adjudicatory function.
Klein's other holding, which protected an extremely broad use of
the presidential pardon power against legislative efforts to protect
the integrity of its penalty-prescribing powers,21 2 represents an ap-
plication of the same principles. Both power claims were extremely
broad in their potential impact on the powers of the competing
branch, so a comparison of the breadth of actual impact is inconclu-
sive. In effect, Congress claimed the power to nullify presidential
pardons and the President claimed the power to nullify the effects
of congressional legislation on disloyalty to the Union.213 There is a
difference, however, in the relative depth of the incursions into the
essential nature of each branch's functions, as textually defined. A
pardon for past actions, even if granted to whole categories of
people, is still directly related to the purposes of the pardon pow-
er;214 legislation aimed at past behavior already defined as criminal
209. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145 (emphasis added).
210. Indeed, it may not even restrict Congress' power to withdraw appellate jurisdiction
for pending cases so long as the withdrawal is not conditioned upon a finding of fact. See Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); note 171 supra.
211. See text accompanying notes 167-68 supra.
212. See note 165 supra and accompanying text.
213. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 140-41.
214. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 380 (1866).
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and already pardoned is related less directly to the general legisla-
tive purpose of prospectively controlling conduct. As the Court
noted, the "great and controlling purpose" of such legislation was
simply to deny the effect of pardons already granted by the Presi-
dent,215 a purpose only dubiously related to general legislative pow-
er. If the Court had permitted Congress to rescind executive par-
dons in this manner, in principle the pardon power itself would
have been threatened. On the other hand, the Court's resolution
leaves intact the general legislative power to define penalties pro-
spectively. 216
Kilbourn v. Thompson 217 also is consistent with the Nixon princi-
ple. If Congress can use its contempt power to enforce a highly
general claim of need for information,218 even when not relevant to
any pending legislation and regarding a matter already in litiga-
tion, 219 the usurpation of the general adjudicatory function is pro-
found. 220 The potential for judicial interference with the legislative
need for information is relatively less preemptive because the judi-
cial claim is restricted to matters related to a pending case, especially
when, as in both Kilbourn and Nixon, the balance can be changed if a
more specific legislative need for the claimed authority is shown.221
215. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
216. A broader executive daim might require the opposite outcome, however, if the
character of the pardon were, on balance, too close to normal legislative purposes to be related
directly to the traditional purposes of an executive pardon. The depth of the incursion into
essentially legislative functions would increase as the pardon conditions were less clearly
reductions in sentence and more like changes in the sentence. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S.
480 (1927) (President cannot substitute one kind of punishment for another). Furthermore,
the breadth of the incursion would increase as the behavior pardoned becomes less specific
and more prospective. In any of these circumstances, it becomes more difficult to justify the
pardon as the traditional executive act of mercy. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,
380 (1866); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTITTrION OF THE UNITED STATES §1498
(4th ed. 1873). See generally Boudin, supra note 157.
217. 103 U.S. 168 (1880). See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra.
218. 103 U.S. at 194-95.
219. Id. at 193. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) (Congress may require
disclosure of information in aid of its constitutional power even if the information may be of
use in a pending suit).
220. The case thus illustrates the Court's assumption that a branch can "intrude" upon
the abstract function of another branch by usurping its function even if its operations are not
being impeded directly. The Court apparently viewed the legislature's purpose as being the
judicial one of imposing punishment for past conduct and thus constituting an intrusion into
the judicial function. If a legislature were to "act like" a court in its use of the contempt power,
but for a purpose more clearly legislative in nature, there would be relatively less "intrusion"
into the judicial function. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). Although
Kilbourn might be explained today in terms of witness' first and fifth amendment rights, the
Court clearly intended to rely on separation of powers.
221. 103 U.S. at 194-95; see McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (upholding
congressional power of inquiry and compulsory process in aid of "contemplated legislation").
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Similarly, the contempt power cases222 rationalized by the distinction
between "internal" and "external" functions make more sense if the
significance of the "internal" nature of the contempt power-to
protect the department's decisionmaking process-is seen as an
index of the relative narrowness of that branch's claim, rather than
as some absolute method of separating shared functions.
The traditional judicial explanation that one branch may not
interfere with "essential" functions of another branch also is better
understood in light of the Nixon principles. Although the doctrine
of constitutional balance does involve the possibility that one branch
legitimately might interfere with an essential function of another,
''essentialness" is also a measure of the depth of interference that
must be evaluated in order to maximize the functions of both
competing branches. The Court's protection of the presidential
power to remove executive officers in Myers v. United States223 was
based partly on the defensible judgment that requiring congression-
al approval of specific executive removals would intrude more deep-
ly on the presidential responsibility to enforce the laws than the
presidential power of removal would detract from the largely intact
power of Congress to set policies for executive implementation. 224 A
different balance was struck, however, in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,225 when the presidential removal power was asserted
against congressional efforts to set standards for removal. The
congressional standards demonstrably were related to the achieve-
ment of the policies that the executive branch was required to
implement. 226 Therefore, presidential removal power would have
cut deeply into congressional policymaking authority. The degree of
legislative intrusion into classical executive authority was less,
222. See texts accompanying notes 160, 173 & 177-78 supra.
223. 272 U.S. 52 (1926); see text accompanying notes 185-86 supra.
224. 272 U.S. at 128, 134-35.
225. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
226. The Court stated: "The [Federal Trade] commission is to be nonpartisan; and it
must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the
enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor
executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Like the Interstate
Commerce Commission, its members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a
body of experts ....
"The legislative reports in both houses of Congress clearly reflect the view that a fixed term
was necessary to the effective and fair administration of the law." Id. at 624. The labels
"executive," "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" are misleading, however, because the
purpose of the Commission was unquestionably to enforce the statute. These phrases are
better understood as referring to the extent to which statutory removal criteria are related to
the underlying purposes of the legislation.
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though, because specific presidential decisions were not to be re-
viewed by Congress. These two removal-powers cases maximize the
powers of both branches within the same decisionmaking arena,
favoring the less burdensome interference but not denying that
significant interference is constitutionally permissible.
Finally, the Nixon principles explain some of the force behind
Justice Black's insistence that the presidential seizure of the nation's
steel mills contradicted the basic rule that the Constitution entrusts
the lawmaking authority to Congress. 227 Because the President
shares, to some indeterminate degree, legislative policymaking for
the use of armed forces, it is not sufficient to ground the Steel
Seizure228 decision merely on a description of the seizure as a "legis-
lative" act.229 Nevertheless, it is possible to compare the depth and
breadth of the executive's intrusion into the legislative function with
the competing congressional interference in acknowledged areas of
executive responsibility. The presidential claim was limited mainly
by its dependence on the existence of armed hostilities in Korea and
by the emergency that was said to threaten the army commanded by
the President if reliance were placed solely on the policies set by
Congress. 230 Neither of these limitations, however, persuasively de-
scribes a potentially narrow intrusion into legislative functions. Al-
though the first would permit presidential displacement of
Congress only during armed hostilities, the displacement could ex-
tend to all of the "internal affairs of the country" that conceivably
could affect the operation of the armed forces. 231 The second limita-
tion is also an extremely broad justification for displacement of
legislative authority because the claim of emergency or necessity was
grounded specifically on the consequences of decisions made by the
competing branch of government. If one branch can avoid displace-
ment only by acceding to the outcomes desired by the competing
branch, real decisionmaking authority has been transferred. If, for
example, courts could be displaced by executive tribunals simply
because the judicial and executive adjudications might yield differ-
ent outcomes, the general judicial power would exist in name on-
ly.232 In contrast, although the power claimed by Congress in the
227. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579,587-88
(1952); see text accompanying notes 188-94 supra.
228. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
229. "This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities." Id. at 587.
230. Id. at 642-54 (Jackson, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).
232. Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) (martial rule can never exist
when the courts are open and can exercise jurisdiction properly and without obstruction).
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Steel Seizure Case could affect significantly the timing or success of
particular military operations, it did not threaten generally the Pres-
ident's essential authority to command the armed forces. Congress
did not seek power to make or overrule particular tactical decisions
or even to influence the fundamental decision to commit troops to
Korea.
Abstract functional differentiation, based on constitutional text
and classical definition of function, is central to the process of
reconciling claims for power in the face of the dual structural re-
quirements of balance and separation. The necessary judicial in-
quiries are difficult, to be sure, but not impractical. Comparative
determinations can be made of the depth of the intrusion into each
branch's abstract function and the breadth of the intrusion into each
branch's actual operations. The resolution least restrictive to both
branches can be determined through such inquiries and can be used
to accommodate the principles of balance and separation.
III. THE LIMITS OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
The discussion in Part I argued that separation of powers princi-
ples should apply to federal-state relationships as well as to wholly
federal relationships. Part II described the underlying judicial
analysis that has been employed to apply separation of powers, at
least at the federal level. The purpose of this Part is to explore the
ramifications of applying this same separation of powers analysis to
federal-state relationships, particularly the relationship between
federal courts and state executive and legislative branches.
Utilization of separation of powers principles is not, of course, a
substitute for efforts to define substantive limitations on federal
power. Wherever the substantive boundary of federal-state relations
is drawn, however, separation of powers principles provide an inde-
pendent measure of the appropriateness of a particular federal
branch's interference with a state government. Thus the present
analysis is useful, not for determining whether some interference by
the federal government is authorized or required, but for determin-
ing the proper method and scope of the interference.
Application of separation of powers principles to federal-state
relationships raises a host of difficult questions. For example, what
are the limits to the power of Congress to interfere with state
executive functions,233 or to the power of the federal executive to
233. See note 104 supra; note 305 infra and accompanying text.
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interfere with state legislatures? Does the guarantee of a republican
form of government impose restrictions, enforceable by Congress,
on the wholly internal structure of state governments? 23 4
The discussion in this Part, however, will be limited to that
increasingly common form of federal interference: the federal
courts' interference with state executive branches and, to a lesser
extent, with state legislative branches. In particular, the separation
of powers principles derived in Part II will be applied to the prob-
lem of defining the limits of federal equitable remedies directed
against recalcitrant state executives and legislatures.
A. Measuring the Relative Degree of the Intrusion
At first glance, functional differentiation appears inapplicable to
the array of modern equitable remedies because judicial remedies,
like pardons and vetoes, represent one of those merged functions
inherent in a balanced Constitution. It is impossible to evaluate the
propriety of such tools as regulatory injunctions or receiverships
simply by descriptively comparing their purposes or processes with
those of the other branches. It is equally impossible, however, to
tolerate the conclusion that the general functions of one branch can
be engulfed or displaced by a single constitutional "check," for the
general functions have a presumptively equal claim to constitutional
authority. Short of total displacement, it is not enough to say that
constitutional balance requires functional overlap and interference
because, at the points of conflict, the concurrent powers cannot both
be implemented fully. It is possible, however, to employ functional
differentiation to maximize both competing claims, subordinating to
the minimum extent possible the broader or less essential claim to
authority.
As indicated by the discussion in Part II, the most convincing
judicial efforts to implement separation of powers have been based
on a comparison of the depth and breadth of the competing intru-
sions into the textually or classically defined functions of each
branch. These same comparisons are useful in determining the
proper scope and form of federal equitable remedies against state
institutions. Two characteristics of modern equitable remedies, their
detail and their range, illustrate how the competing intrusions can
be compared for purposes of resolving separation of powers prob-
lems.
234. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; cf. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (political
question limitation prevents the Court from enforcing the republican guarantee).
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1. Detail in the decree.
The tendency to find very specific requirements in the Constitu-
tion's general language has increased greatly since 1960, especially
among the lower courts. 235 The Supreme Court has defined the
precise warning that must be given criminal defendants to assure
the voluntariness of confessions236 and has determined the nature of
the states' interests in unborn life at each stage of pregnancy, 237 but
the lower courts have gone much further. They have relied on the
due process clause to impose a precise staff-patient ratio in a mental
health facility and to set the specific content necessary for an ade-
quate individualized medical treatment plan.238 In prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment, a lower court has established standards
for the minimum number of square feet in a prisoner's cell (60), the
number of minutes of daily outdoor exercise for prisoners in isola-
tion (30), the number of urinals to be provided (one urinal or foot of
urinal trough per every 15 inmates), and such miscellany as a re-
quirement that each dietary supervisor have at least a bachelor's
degree in dietetics.239 The Supreme Court has approved orders
mandating the specifics of state apportionment schemes 240 and local
education programs; 241 state officials have been enjoined from "fail-
ing to implement 242 these detailed orders. Other aspects of judicial
decrees can involve great detail: Courts have considered and some-
times actually have exercised a supervisory function over executive
appointments,243 and have appointed judicial receivers to make
specific executive decisions. 244
Depth of the intrusion. Because courts deal only with specific
cases or controversies, their remedies necessarily are specific and
detailed to some extent. Judicial orders traditionally control specific
235. See Robbins & Buser, supra note 2, at 893-94.
236. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-74 (1966).
237. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-65 (1973).
238. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 383-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
239. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd in relevant part sub
noa. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); see Robbins & Buser, supra note 2.
240. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
241. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977); cases cited in note 256
infra.
242. E.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in relevant part sub
nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
243. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974);
Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
244. See Roberts, supra note 2.
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conduct, including executive conduct. In constitutional cases, how-
ever, the court's function often is to enforce very general mandates
such as "due process." Detail in decrees enforcing such broad man-
dates is relevant to measuring the depth of the judiciary's intrusion
into the functions of other branches.
When the constitutional language is broad, the judicial function
is to articulate the broad policies contained in the Constitution, and
to determine whether existing conditions are in compliance. The
classical function of the executive is to decide detailed questions
about how to implement constitutional policies. Therefore, a judi-
cial decree specifying in detail how policy should be implemented
intrudes deeply into the executive function. Alternatively, although
detail is not necessarily unrelated to the purposes of constitutional
adjudication, the plausibility that the injunctive language is neces-
sary to fulfill the courts' constitutional function decreases as the gap
between the generality of the constitutional language and the speci-
ficity of the injunctive language increases. It must be acknowledged,
for example, that the Constitution might be satisfied with something-
less than a bachelor's degree in dietetics in an institutional kitchen,
and a decree that implements the due process clause by mandating
the use of standards set by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) plausibly adjudicates the constitutional issue
only to the extent that HEW can be thought to have done so in
issuing its regulations.245 Indeed, some courts have framed their
constitutional analysis so that it is nearly impossible to discern
whether any particular part of the court order represents a constitu-
tional requirement or precisely how the decree might bear on the
underlying constitutional violation.246 The point here is not to ques-
tion current requirements inferred from some constitutional provi-
sions; it is merely to note what courts themselves seem to acknowl-
245. The Wyatt decree, for example, mandated compliance with the regulations of HEW
with regard to medical experimentation. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 380 (M.D. Ala.
1972), affd in part sub noa. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). In Pugh, the
court mandated compliance with standards set by the United States Public Health Service as
well as by the Center for Correctional Psychology at the University of Alabama. Pugh v. Locke,
406 F. Supp. 318, 332-33 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd in relevant part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
246. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971). The constitutional stature of specific racial quotas in school desegregation cases, quotas
that are referred to as "starting points," is similarly ambiguous. See Swann v, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971). For an analysis of how court-imposed prison
standards have exceeded the nature of the court-defined violation, see Robbins & Buser, supra
note 2.
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edge, at least implicitly: Such explicit detail in the decree often is
unnecessary to protect the constitutional right involved. The Su-
preme Court acknowledged this in Bounds v. Smith,247 where broad
discretion was left to state governments in deciding how best to
assure prisoners adequate access to federal courts.2 48 In short, some
degree of deference to the state executive function with regard to
specificity might interfere with the judicial function less than execu-
tive compliance with the detailed judicial decree might interfere
with the executive function.
Breadth of the intrusion. Detail in the decree is also relevant to
measuring the breadth of the intrusion into the operations of the
other branches. The amount of detail in a decree is an index of the
extent to which executive and legislative decisionmaking is limited
with regard to matters not under litigation. For example, to the
extent that a decree mandates the specific amounts of space or time
that must be devoted to prison recreation, resources available for
other prison programs, programs that might not be challenged in
the lawsuit, are diminished.2 49 A court that mandates specific per-
sonnel procedures obviously affects the way in which all executive
functions are carried out.250 In short, to the extent that a decree is so
detailed as to approximate judicial operation of school or prison
systems, the relative displacement of executive and legislative au-
thority is extremely broad, extending even to matters not under
adjudication.
2. Range of the decree.
Modern decrees often have long duration and wide impact. The
length of time over which the decree controls executive or legislative
behavior is clearly one index of both the depth and breadth of the
invasion of their functions. It is the range of behavior that the
decree seeks to control, however, that most clearly demonstrates the
degree of judicial intrusion into the functions of other branches.
The power to make and implement policy governing the affairs
247. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
248. Id. at 830-32. Although the Court upheld a lower court order requiring state prison
officials to provide law libraries for inmates in order to assure "right to access" to federal
courts, the Court left to state officials broad authority to devise other remedies that equally
could assure access.
249. See Taft, supra note 2, at 347.
250. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (order of district court requiring submis-
sion of program to handle citizen complaints about police misconduct unwarrantedly inter-
fered with state's internal affairs and disregarded principles of federalism).
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of individuals who have committed no legal wrong is, of course, a
classical description of the legislative and executive functions;2 5 1 the
power to coerce individuals who have committed a legal wrong in
order to redress that wrong is a classical judicial role.252 The func-
tions overlap when the coercion of the wrongdoer has consequences
for third parties who are strangers to the suit. A school busing
decree entered against officials found to have participated in racial
segregation obviously affects children and parents who have not
participated in constitutional violations and who are not parties to
the lawsuit at all. This result is not unique to modern extensions of
judicial power; traditional remedies have some incidental or intend-
ed effect on those who deal with the defendant.253 Although some
third-party consequences of a judicial remedy are inevitable, the
decree should not inevitably displace legislative and executive deci-
sions-at least no more so than a general legislative policy that
incidentally affects parties to a lawsuit and frustrates a judicial
decree should inevitably predominate over that decree. In either
case, one branch is claiming an inherent power to encroach upon
the functions of the other branch as an incident to performing its
acknowledged responsibilities. The clearest example, perhaps, of
widespread third-party consequences is a decree that necessarily
requires substantial expenditures; such an order leads either to
increased general taxes or to fewer resources being available for
alternative programs. When the welfare and behavior of virtually
every resident of a state or city might be affected by a judicial
remedy, both the depth and breadth of the intrusion into the func-
tions of the executive and legislative branches are most obvious.254
The application of separation of powers principles to such
251. "The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the communi-
ty. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated." THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 522-23 (A.
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
252. See United States v. Brown, -381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (the Bill of Attainder clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, is "an implementation of the separation of powers, a general
safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by legisla-
ture").
253. A limited and "traditional" finding of a constitutional violation might implicate
wide third-party consequences if broad affirmative action is necessary to correct the violation.
For example, protection against impairment of contracts of a limited number of municipal
bondholders might be thought to require control over every aspect of city government if the
city's financial problems were sufficiently pervasive. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472
(1880).
254. "The judiciary... has no influence over either the sword or the purse. . . . It
• . . must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments." THE FEDERusT No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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conflicts requires that the branch least able to demonstrate a specific
need for the scope of its intrusion into the classically defined func-
tions of the other branch find a less Intrusive means of carrying out
its function. Specifically, the burden on the judiciary should be to
demonstrate that it could not redress the adjudicated violation by
involving fewer third-party consequences. The burden on the ex-
ecutive or legislative branch should be to demonstrate that its au-
thority does not affect parties to the adjudication in ways that
unnecessarily frustrate judicial redress.
B. Recent Supreme Court Standards
The Supreme Court has not adopted a separation of powers
analysis to limit the lower federal courts' intrusions into state execu-
tive and legislative functions, perhaps on the assumption that it had
essentially foreclosed this possibility as early as Baker v. Carr.255
Instead, the Court has attempted to restrain excessive lower court
intrusions by a halting, ad hoc process that has avoided directly
threatening the lower courts' potentially limitless reserve of authori-
ty over state institutions. The Court has relied on a rather variable
application of the vague equitable maxim that "the nature of the
. . .remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the
violation." 25 6 The cases and decisions suggest, however, that the
Court's use of this rule can be understood better as a tentative,
indirect application of the separation of powers analysis derived
from United States v. Nixon 257 and its evolutionary precedents. By
analyzing the Court's restraints in light of the separation principles
already developed, 25 8 a coherent rationale emerges that can provide
the necessary standards for the lower courts and properly can divide
responsibilities among all the branches of the federal government.
255. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
256. Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749,2757 (1977). Compare, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (if purposeful discrimination exists in one part of a citywide school
system, a presumption exists that the entire system must be desegregated), and Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding use of pairing and busing
to remedy de jure segregation), with Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424
(1976) (court's responsibility ends after it implements a racially neutral attendance pattern),
and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (interdistrict desegregation remedy inappro-
priate if no interdistrict violation exists). For more recent examples, compare Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977) (remanded for more specific findings because of
disparity between evidence of constitutional violations and the remedy decreed), with Milliken
v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977) (courts may impose remedial programs where necessary to
correct ills of segregation).
257. 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see text accompanying notes 195-205 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 195-232 supra.
[Vol. 30:661
FEDERAL EQUITABLE REMEDIES
When deference to the executive or legislative branches would
not result in any diminution of the effectiveness of judicial relief,
the Court has used the "scope of the violation" rule to assess the
relative scope and necessity of competing intrusions. In White v.
Weiser,259 for example, the Court reversed a lower court's reappor-
tionment order because it was designed to achieve compact, contigu-
ous districts at the expense of a state policy favoring a minimum
number of electoral contests between incumbents. Because this state
policy would not limit judicial redress for violations of the one-
person-one-vote standard, 260 the state policy did not intrude on the
judicial function. The court had intruded unnecessarily upon the
legislative function, however, because the judicial preference for
compactness did not promote population equality among the dis-
tricts and therefore was not essential to the judicial function. In
holding that a court's remedies should not "intrude upon state
policy any more than necessary," 261 the Court reconciled the
competing functions by the same separation of powers principle that
applies at the federal level. It chose the least intrusive means to
effectuate both branches' functions.
In White, proper regard for state policies did not reduce the
effectiveness of judicial relief, but this is not always the case. When
deference to other branches would make the judicial remedy mar-
ginally less effective, the degree of the intrusion into the judicial
function necessitated by this deference should still be balanced
against the degree of the judicial intrusion into state policy-formula-
tion functions. No judicial remedy can be fully effective. The judg-
ment of what is necessary to rectify the "condition that offends the
Constitution"262 requires an essentially imaginary determination of
the state of affairs that would have existed but for the violation. The
consequences of a violation are speculative and potentially unlimit-
ed. Full redress for harm done by school segregation, for example,
could be thought to entail protection and compensation of millions
of adults for whatever personal inadequacies are traceable to their
segregated schooling as children. Indeed, the Court on occasion has
approved rather massive changes in school curricula to redress the
inadequacies of segregated schooling.263 If educational deprivations
259. 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
260. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (announcing the one-person-one-vote
standard for state reapportionments).
261. 412 U.S. at 795 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971)).
262. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
263. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977).
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must be compensated, why not the countless other personal, social
and economic deprivations that flow from educational disadvan-
tages? Intoning traditional maxims to the effect that remedial pow-
ers are "not unlimited" and must be based on a "balancing of
individual and collective interests" at most acknowledges the prob-
lem, 264 but does not resolve it.
The Supreme Court has masked the contradiction between the
proposition that remedial power "must be adequate to the task" of
correcting the constitutional violation and the proposition that re-
medial powers are "not unlimited" by rather unconvincing charac-
terizations of the underlying violations. 265 In Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler,266 for example, the Court held it erroneous to
continue a school desegregation order after the target racial quotas
had been achieved. The Court dealt with the case as if all aspects of
the initial violation had been eliminated and full redress had been
achieved; hence the time span of the judicial control exceeded the
violation. 267 Full redress had not been achieved, however, if ever it
could be. The educational success of the integration program had
not been shown, and success in areas such as teacher hiring and
promotion had not been achieved. 268 Implying that full redress is
possible by narrowly characterizing the initial violation does not aid
analysis.
Nor is it helpful to rely on defining the scope of the violation in
264. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
265. An early example of this phenomenon is found in Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S.
472 (1880), in which the plurality opinion supplemented vigorous separation of powers
language with a rather strained insistence that there had been no impairment of contract in
any event. Id. at 511, 514 (Field, Miller and Bradley, J J., concurring in the judgment). There
was little doubt that the challenged legislation had been designed to reduce the amount of
required repayment on the debt for which the city had contracted. Id. at 532 (Strong, Swayne
and Harlan, JJ., dissenting); see Amy v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 114 U.S. 387 (1885). To
argue in 1880 that legislated reductions in any substantial aspect of a contract, especially in its
value, were not impairments was contrary to common understanding. See 102 U.S. at 532-33
(Strong, Swayne and Harlan, JJ., dissenting); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 535, 553 (1867). In other cases in which the Court was willing to find an impairment of
contract, the necessary judicial involvement in executive and legislative functions was far more
limited because the taxes could be raised by use of existing governmental apparatus rather
than by the broad receivership required in Meriwether. See, e.g., Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S.
289 (1886); Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1881). Thus the Court, then as now,
preferred strained interpretations of the underlying constitutional right to unambiguous
admissions that full correction of some violations might require action that the judiciary was
not empowered to take.
266. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
267. Id. at 434-35.
268. Id. at 436.
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order to limit the remedy necessary to correct the consequences of
the violation. In reversing an interdistrict desegregation order in
Milliken v. Bradley,26 9 the Court insisted that an interdistrict remedy
would not have been barred had it been necessary to restore the
victims to the positions they would have occupied but for the initial
segregative acts. 270 The Court explained, however, that in this in-
stance full redress did not require an interdistrict remedy because
the illegal acts had not caused segregation in the suburban dis-
tricts.271 The weakness of this explanation is that, whether or not
segregation had resulted in the suburban districts, the lower court
had found that a failure by defendants to merge districts would
frustrate a remedy in Detroit, where violations certainly had oc-
curred. 27 2 The Court's explanation assumes that because there had
been no interdistrict violations, the decree should not reach across
district lines even though this insulation prevented full redress for
the violations. Prior school desegregation decisions make undeni-
ably clear the power of the court to order defendants to influence
the decisions and lives of individuals who are entirely innocent of
any segregative conduct but whose lives must be affected if defend-
ants are to provide full redress. 27 3 The rule that the "scope of the
remedy should not exceed the scope of the violation" inadequately
explains the Milliken result because the rule is indeterminate to the
extent that it confuses the "scope of the violation" with the scope of
what is necessary to correct the consequences of the violation.
In addition, and most important, the reliance on characteriza-
dons of the underlying violations to limit the extent of judicial relief
tends to constrain the definition of constitutional rights. In Rizzo v.
Goode,274 plaintiffs sought relief from an extensive pattern of police
violations of constitutional rights; the federal district court man-
dated procedures for review of citizen complaints. 275 The Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that the defendant police officials
had not participated in the proven instances of abuse. Moreover, the
Court expressed doubt that a mere failure to act in the face of a
statistical pattern could ever be a constitutional violation,276 and that
269. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
270. Id. at 744.
271. Id. at 745.
272. Id. at 735, 738-39.
273. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
274. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
275. Id. at 365; Council of Organizations v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (1973).
276. 423 U.S. at 371-72.
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the plaintiffs even had presented a "case or controversy."277 Al-
though this characterization prevented rather disproportionate ju-
dicial supervision of the police department, it contains the potential
for a very narrow definition of the citizen's right to be free of police
abuse that is tolerated or even encouraged by the inaction of police
officials. 278
Unpersuasive or limited characterizations of the underlying vio-
lations and the steps necessary to correct them would not have
been necessary to these decisions, if the Court had acknowledged
the relevance of separation of powers principles to the federal-state
relationships involved. Each result can be viewed as a finding that
the judiciary had been unable to demonstrate the relative narrow-
ness and necessity of its intrusion into legislative and executive
responsibilities in order to carry out its own function. In Pasadena,
the judge apparently realized that full redress would require a
lifetime of judicial control over complex, far-reaching educational
decisions. 279 In contrast, subordinating the court's function to those
of the other branches did not directly threaten the major aspects of
the corrective order.280 The maintenance of specific racial quotas,
after all, is not necessarily related very directly to the underlying
constitutional right.28'
Similarly, in Milliken, the lack of an interdistrict remedy would
have affected the achievement of certain racial quotas, but the range
of intradistrict remedies remained wide, and the longrun probabili-
ty of achieving the quotas was somewhat dubious in any event.282
The third-party consequences of an interdistrict order, however,
would be broad indeed. 28 3 The Court's discussion indicates a real
277. Id. at 372.
278. Id. at 382, 387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 433 (1976).
280. Id. at 437-39.
281. The Court itself has insisted that "desegregation. . . does not require any particu-
lar racial balance in each 'school, grade, or classroom.'" Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
740-41 (1974). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
To the extent that particular quotas are aimed at achieving the racial balance that would have
existed but for the segregative acts, the remedy is based on judicial speculation regarding
extremely complex, multi-causal social events, not necessarily constitutional requirements.
282. Of course, the extent to which busing contributes to "white flight," which had
helped to create nearly uniracial schools in Detroit, is widely debated. At the least, the lower
court was proposing as constitutionally required a remedy with an uncertain ultimate effect.
See Clotfelter, The Detroit Decision and White Flight, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (1976); Comment,
Community Resistance to School Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
111, 113 (1976). See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 802 (1974) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
283. "Entirely apart from the logistical and other serious problems attending large-scale
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sensitivity to the depth and breadth of the intrusion into executive
and legislative functions. The rationale would be significantly more
definite and principled if the Court merely had applied the separa-
tion of powers analysis as developed at the federal level.
Finally, the Court in Rizzo emphasized the limited number of
proven violations and the speculative nature of the threat of future
violations, suggesting that abuses could be cured through individual
cases. 284 Thus the claims of the nonjudicial branches for control
over the details of personnel and complaint procedures for the city's
police department were, on the record, only a limited intrusion into
the court's corrective powers when compared to the scope of the
court's intrusion into the normal executive decisionmaking process.
In summary, then, the Court's decisions have been sensitive to
separation of powers considerations, although its explanations have
not referred to that doctrine. If the Court explicitly were.to adopt a
separation of powers rationale, several advantages would accrue.
First, there would be a simplification of analysis. There is a ready-
made doctrine at the federal level that could be adapted to the
federal-state relationship. Second, a coherent doctrine would pro-
vide greater guidance to lower federal courts, who are now subject
to rather ad hoc second-guessing by the Supreme Court. Third,
explicit acknowledgment of inherent limits on the permissible de-
gree of federal judicial intrusion would bolster the legitimacy of the
court's role when it does intrude, and might increase popular confi-
dence and respect for the federal judiciary. Even a coherent expla-
nation from the Supreme Court of why the function of the federal
courts necessarily is limited might be significant in this respect.
Finally, recognition of the separation of powers principle would
indicate to other branches of the state and federal governments
where their constitutional responsibilities lie. It is entirely plausible
that the apparently unlimited authority of the federal courts to
transportation of students, the consolidation would give rise to an array of other problems in
financing and operating this new school system. Some of the more obvious questions would
be: What would be the status and authority of the present popularly elected school boards?
.. .What board or boards would levy taxes. . .? Would the children of Detroit be within the
jurisdiction and operating control of a school board elected by the parents and residents of
other districts? What board or boards would levy taxes for school operations... ?.... What
body would determine that portion of the curricula now left to the discretion of local school
boards? Who would establish attendance zones, purchase school equipment, locate and
construct new schools, and indeed attend to all the myriad day-to-day decisions that are
necessary to school operations affecting potentially more than three-quarters of a million
pupils?" Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743 (1974).
284. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976).
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resolve constitutional problems, and the readiness of some courts to
assert that authority, inhibits other branches of both the state and
federal governments from considering, determining and effectua-
ting their own proper roles in vindicating constitutional rights.
If a separation of powers analysis were applied, the Court would
have to acknowledge that, on occasion, the scope of the only permis-
sible judicial remedies might not be adequate fully to redress a
constitutional violation, at least not without the cooperation of the
other branches of the federal or state governments. This should not
be shocking. Limitations on the power of the judiciary to rectify
constitutional violations already exist; they merely go by other
names. Some limitations long have been acknowledged to inhere in
the "political question" and "case or controversy" requirements. 285
Other limitations have included the vague equitable maxim that the
scope of the remedy should not exceed the scope of the violation.
That formulation not only limits the judicial authority as much as
would the separation of powers analysis, but it also has a dangerous
tendency to induce narrow definitions of constitutional rights and
unconvincing characterizations of both the underlying violation and
the steps necessary to achieve redress.
C. Implications for Judicial Practices
Adoption of separation of powers as a relevant structural princi-
ple in determining the permissible scope of equitable relief would
have a number of implications for current practices among the
federal courts. Some of these implications merely would confirm
and give constitutional significance to present practices; others
would be inconsistent with certain practices of some courts.
1. Postponement of the remedy.
It is generally acknowledged that judicial relief on complicated
matters of broad impact, such as apportionment, should be withheld
until the relevant state institutions have had an opportunity to act.2 86
A similar deference to the executive branch is achieved by providing
it an opportunity to shape the court's decree. Although unobjection-
able in themselves, these judicial practices are inconsistent with
separation of powers unless they include an adequate degree of
deference to the decisions of the other branches. It is not enough to
285. See texts accompanying notes 30-31 & 90-94 supra.
286. E.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406
U.S. 187 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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postpone the judicial decree in order to see if the state legislature
will make the same decision that the court would have made.287 It
might as well have been said in Ex parte Milligan288 that military
tribunals would have been unnecessary if the civilian courts had
given proper assurances that they would adjudicate in the same
manner as the military; or in the Steel Seizure Case289 that the Presi-
dent could seize the steel mills only if Congress failed to take them.
Authority without choice is illusory. A state legislature does not
exercise authority when it appropriates money only because a feder-
al court would do so if the legislature does not,290 nor does a state
executive when a court merely considers its proposals as to the
specific mechanics of how best to achieve certain constitutional ob-
jectives along with the proposals of private litigants in the case. 291 In
addition to providing simply a prior opportunity for other branches
of government to speak on an issue, federal courts should be re-
quired to demonstrate an adequate consideration of the appropriate
degree of deference to those branches.
2. Consideration of the proper degree of deference.
The point at which the judiciary's deference will interfere less
with its function than the decision not to defer will interfere with the
functions of the other branches is a matter that must be decided on
the facts of particular cases. The lower courts should be required,
however, to show a proper consideration of this issue. This burden
should increase as the decree is more detailed or broader in its
impact. At the least, lower courts should be required to specify how
deference to general legislative policies or to the specifics of execu-
tive decisionmaking would impede their efforts to redress the
287. Cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (court would take affirmative steps to
ensure proper funding if state legislature did not promptly implement court's order to
provide such funding). An extreme example is Judge Garrity's order to the Boston School
Committee requiring the appointment of a certain individual as headmaster of South Boston
High School. See note 302 infra.
288. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867); see text accompanying notes 115-20 supra.
289. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
see text accompanying notes 188-94 supra.
290. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
291. See, e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) (entire new set of
regulations drafted after arm's-length bargaining by counsel conducted under the auspices of
the court); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 383-85 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971) (court required state to devise plan for upgrading prisons); SaMarion v. McGinnis,
253 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D.N.Y. 1966) (court ordered Commissioner of Corrections to
formulate a plan which would allow Black Muslim prisoners to practice their religion).
April 1978] 719
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
constitutional violation. This would require federal courts to state
explicitly the less intrusive alternatives considered and the reasons
for their rejection. Since less intrusive remedies could not be reject-
ed without reason, express consideration of the proper degree of
deference would amount to a rule that decisions of the other
branches that are appropriate to their functions but incidentally
affect the judicial function would be treated as presumptively valid.
This is, of course, the same kind of discipline that the judiciary has
imposed on itself with regard to presidential decisions regarding
executive privilege.292 Such self-discipline, at the district court level,
is an essential prerequisite to assuring adequate review of the limits
of the lower courts' functions.
3. Deference in wording the decree.
When intrusion into the functions of the nonjudicial branches is
found to be disproportionate, the court need not necessarily forsake
any decree with detail or broad third-party consequences. In such
circumstances, separation of powers principles require only that the
judicial function be subordinated to the minimum extent necessary
to avoid disproportionate intrusion into the functions of the other
branch. This requirement often can be met by preserving the op-
portunity for a final decision by the more appropriate branch by
explicitly acknowledging, for example, that the detail in the decree
is only representative of a level of change that would be constitution-
ally acceptable. Thus the decree should be worded so that legislative
or executive decisions that later lead to minor variances, such as in
the numerical ratios of the races in integrated schools, would not be
technical violations of the decree. To the extent that certain details,
like the specifics of racial quotas or the qualifications of institutional
cooks,293 are really only constitutional "starting points,"294 they
should be so treated in wording the decree and subordinated to
legitimate responses from the legislative or executive branches.2 95
With regard to the breadth of the decree's impact, finality often
can be preserved for the appropriate branch by ordering only the
less intrusive remedy while allowing the appropriate branch an
opportunity to avoid this remedy by its own decision to implement
292. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); text accompanying notes 195-205
supra.
293. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd in relevant part sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); text accompanying notes 235-50 supra.
294. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
295. See notes 246-48 supra and accompanying text.
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the broader remedy. The clearest example of this method is the
traditional hesitancy of the courts directly to order states to raise
money for mandated changes.296 In many circumstances, some rem-
edy short of direct judicial mandating of programs or involvement
in taxation is available: Prisoners can be released, damages can be
awarded, programs can be enjoined, less costly modifications in
programs can be ordered. Therefore, frequently courts simply an-
nounce the kinds of changes that will have to be made in order to
avoid imposition of the less intrusive, but perhaps more drastic,
remedy. 297
Although this practice often indirectly requires the state to ap-
propriate money, it does preserve final judgment in the appropriate
branch with regard to whether and how the money should be raised
and allocated. This concession is not a mere formality in light of the
balancing of competing intrusions required by separation of powers
principles. It is evidence that the judiciary has intruded into nonju-
dicial functions no more than necessary to perform its own function.
The choice left to the competing branch is real, though difficult. A
society might well prefer the more limited judicial remedy to the
costs of complying with the broader remedy. For example, a state
might prefer to have some patients or prisoners released rather than
pay the costs of constitutionally adequate institutional conditions. In
contrast, the tendency of some courts to threaten not the less drastic
remedy, but a judicial effort to raise the funds necessary for the
more intrusive mandate, simply displaces the legislative function in
the broadest possible manner.298
4. Judicial appointment of executive officers.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to permit direct judicial
influence over executive appointments is well-founded in principles
of separation of powers.299 The identity of the person who holds an
executive position is a detail that is most indirectly related to the
judicial function. To justify the appointment of an executive officer
as an appropriate function, the judiciary would have to claim that
only a particular person is capable of implementing the remedy.
The impact on the general executive function is as broad as possible
296. For a criticism of this reluctance, see Comment, Enforcement of Judicial Financing
Orders: Constitutional Rights in Search of a Remedy, supra note 2.
297. See, e.g., id. at417 n.10.
298. E.g., WAVyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
299. See cases cited in note 243 supra.
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because the identity of the officeholder affects every decision en-
trusted by law to that office, not just those affecting the adjudicated
remedy.
The use of receivers, and of masters and monitors, to the extent
that their effect is to influence specific executive decisions, 300 also
represents extremely broad, though more temporary, intrusions
into the executive function. Such orders should be reviewed careful-
ly to ensure that the duties entrusted to the judicial officer are
narrowly limited to correcting the violation, an effort not always
made by the lower courts. 301 Moreover, receivers should not be
installed to replace executive officers.30 2 Such appointments amount
to judicial displacement of the executive removal power, a power
recognized in the Constitution and the case law as essential to effec-
tive executive functioning.30 3 The power to remove implies the
power to demand loyalty, and no broader intrusion into the execu-
tive function is imaginable than judicial power to inject itself into
executive lines of accountability. Judicial agents should be required
to work with, not replace, their executive counterparts and should
be required to give presumptive validity to executive proposals on
issues normally entrusted to the executive. Power to override this
presumption should be granted to the judicial agent only with
respect to specific duties.
5. Cooperation with other federal branches.
Finally, if these limitations on federal judicial remedies make
fully adequate enforcement of a constitutional guarantee impossible
because of obstinate state institutions, the court should seek cooper-
ation from the appropriate branches of the federal government.
The most obvious means of doing so would be for the court expli-
300. The informal roles taken on by masters and monitors can approximate the formal
duties of a receiver. See, e.g., Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of ajudicial Decree Ordering
Institutional Change, supra note 2.
301. Indeed, the Wyatt court enforced the monitors' demands even when they went
beyond the broad contours of their duties. Id. at 1351, 1353, 1362-64. On the appeal of Pugh
v. Locke, the Fifth Circuit ordered that the district court's 39-member Human Rights Commit-
tee be replaced by a single monitor for each prison, who would have "full authority to observe,
and to report his observations to the Court, with no authority to intervene in daily prison
operations." Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1977).
302. In the Boston school desegregation litigation, Judge Garrity temporarily replaced
the Boston School Committee, which by statute had administrative responsibility for operating
the school, with a receiver. Roberts, supra note 2, at 55 n. 1. Judge Garrity also ordered the
transfer of South Boston High's administrative staff. Later he simply ordered the Committee
to hire a particular individual as headmaster. Id. at 61 n.33.
303. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see text accompanying notes 223-26 supra.
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citly to acknowledge the separation of powers limitations on its
remedies, and issue a declarative judgment that the existing situa-
tion is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has specifically recog-
nized the availability of this means of affording judicial redress
while avoiding overly intrusive remedies.30 4 Acknowledgment of
separation of powers limits, combined with a declaratory judgment,
constitutes a clear message to the other federal branches that their
cooperation is necessary if the constitutional guarantee is to be
effective. Once the declaratory judgment is issued, section 5 of the
14th amendment explicitly grants Congress the power to
respond. °5
Allowing courts to adjudicate constitutional issues and to issue
declaratory judgments without being required to fashion a
"complete" remedy appears to involve some risks. Without the
constraints inherent in fashioning immediately effective remedies,
the use of the power of judicial review might become too undiscip-
lined, creating the same problems as advisory opinions. Irrespons-
ible use of the declaratory judgment is unlikely, however, because it
is unlikely that separation of powers principles would ever foreclose
all relief against the state government except the declaratory judg-
ment. Thus the declaratory judgment normally would be entered in
combination with other forms of relief that would act to discipline
the use of the power of judicial review as they do now. Furthermore,
the declaratory judgment would have the advantage of emphasizing
the responsibilities of all branches of government to guarantee
compliance with constitutional norms.
IV. CONCLUSION
In applying separation of powers in Ex parte Milligan,30 6 the
Supreme Court commented that the framers had foreseen "that
troublous times would arise, when rulers and people would become
restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to
304. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969) ("We need express no opinion
about the appropriateness of coercive relief [against the House of Representatives], for
petitioners sought a declaratory judgment, a form of relief the District Court could have
issued.").
305. The power of Congress to implement the 14th amendment has been interpreted
extremely broadly. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966). See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17 (1976)
(reserving the question whether Congress could "affect integral operations of state govern-
ment" through its § 5 authority).
306. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867).
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accomplish ends deemed just and proper."30 7 Although the modern
pressures for sharp and decisive measures arise from justified im-
patience at a lack of social reform rather than from a military
insurrection, and although the pressures are directed at the federal
courts rather than at the executive, constitutional structure is
threatened nevertheless. The Court's conclusion in Milligan is as
relevant to the judiciary today as it was to President Lincoln: "The
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people...
at all times, and under all circumstances." 308
Application of the constitutional principle of separation of pow-
ers to the federal judiciary's relations with the states does not neces-
sarily imply rejection of either reform-minded constitutional in-
terpretations or innovative decrees. If separation principles are ap-
plied to limiting judicial remedies, it requires no assumption of judi-
cial deference to the other branches' judgments regarding the mean-
ing of the Constitution. Adoption of separation principles does not
involve rigid, mechanistic judicial rules. But it might make the
judicial enforcement of some constitutional remedies more difficult,
'and it would, in some cases, force open acknowledgment that there
are limits to the level of redress that courts alone can provide.
To the extent that the courts would explain limitations on the
scope of equitable relief by comparing the relative degree of intru-
siveness of the claims of the competing branches, they would be
defining the limits of their own function in the same way that they
traditionally define the limits of the functions of the other branches
of the federal government. This would demonstrate the degree of
consistent regard for constitutional structure and process that the
public has a right to expect of courts of law. The legitimacy of
judicial decrees would be enhanced, and appropriate responsibility
for constitutional redress would be placed on all the branches and
levels of government.
The redress that courts do accomplish should be achieved by an
institution with flexible but ascertainable limits to its power, even
when rulers and people are impatient to achieve ends deemed "just
and proper." The relevant principle for reestablishing some sense of
functional appropriateness for the federal courts is separation of
powers. Legal commentators and courts should begin the potentially
constructive business of deciding how separation of powers applies
to the scope of equitable relief in particular cases.
307. Id. at 120.
308. Id. at 120-21.
[Vol. 30:661
